

SYMPATHETIC STRIKES

AND

SYMPATHETIC LOCKOUTS

BY

FRED. S. HALL, A. B.

Sometime University Fellow in Finance

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN THE

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITION

TWO conventions met in Sydney, Australia, in the month of September, 1890. One represented the interests of almost all the organized labor of the continent, while at the other council sat the controllers of its several largest industries.¹ A strike was in progress, but not a strike of the ordinary type. Thousands of men in all parts of the island, some even in New Zealand and Tasmania,² had refused to work until justice, as they regarded it, should be done to a few marine officers involved in a dispute with their employers. Trade lines had disappeared. Sailors, sheep-shearers, miners, cooks, stewards, stokers and dockers, all stood side by side in their great struggle.

As an illustration of the possibilities of industrial warfare, this strike has had few counterparts in the world's history. In Australia an uprising on such a scale was altogether unknown. With true British instinct, the Government of New South Wales at once appointed a Commission to investigate the subject, and, if possible, to suggest a remedy. The report of this Commission, a quarto volume of over a thousand pages, is the most comprehensive, if not the most valuable, work ever published on the subject of strikes.³ In this report the essential features of the new movement are

¹ *Nineteenth Century*, v. 29, p. 234.

² *Report of the Labour Correspondent to the Board of Trade upon Strikes and Lockouts in 1890*, p. 252 (Parl. Papers, 1890-1891, v. lxxviii.).

³ I am indebted to Dr. Albert Shaw for the use of his copy of this report.

stated in words which have an international application, and are, therefore, reproduced here.

"The federation of labor and the counter-federation of employers is the characteristic feature of the present epoch. A few years ago each Union was an independent organization though the sympathy between the different trades was strong, and showed itself repeatedly in the form of subscriptions to other trades when their members were on a strike or were locked out. But now the Union of men in a trade has developed into a Union of different trades together, and practical sympathy has taken the form of aiding a strike by striking also. This, of course, has the effect of increasing the area of the contest and of dragging into it persons not originally involved."¹

This increased area of the contest and the large number of men who are thus involved has made the sympathetic strike the subject of considerable attention. The great strike at the London Docks in 1889 was largely sympathetic, while the gigantic contest at Chicago in 1894 was almost entirely so. More significant, however, than the great size of sympathetic strikes is the fact that such strikes seem to have no necessary limit to their extension. The number of men who may decide to strike "out of sympathy" is infinite. Infinite extension was impossible before the sympathetic regime. A strike was limited by custom to those who suffered, who had grievances to be redressed. The originators of a sympathetic strike recognize no such limits. In every one of the great sympathetic strikes of history threats of a universal strike have been put forth.² It is these threats, or more truly the possibility behind them, which give the study of sympathetic strikes its importance and give to its conclusions a very practical value.

¹ *Report of the Royal Commission of New South Wales on Strikes*, 1891, p. 27.

² What is probably the earliest of these threats appeared in the *New York Times*, March 24, 1886.

Readers are familiar with the strike discussions which fill so large a place in the magazines of the day. Such articles aim to justify one side or the other in the case, or to enable the reader to do so. To this end the story of the dispute is recounted in great detail, with its agreements which are not kept, its understandings which are not understood, the wage system in use, complicated sometimes by sliding scales and bonuses, and the usual amount of personality and abuse. Such details are essential to the understanding of "grievance" strikes. Their introduction is in order to explain the causes and justice of the movement. These last, however, are questions which it is unnecessary to touch when sympathetic strikes only are described. The omission of these complicated and sometimes technical details may make the present discussion less obscure than the average article on the subject of strikes. The study attempted here confines itself to the machinery by which an original or grievance strike is extended sympathetically. In what direction does this extension take place? How does it accomplish its purpose in aiding the original strike? What limits, if any, are there to such an extension? These are the questions to which an answer is attempted in the following pages.

The industrial phenomenon, now generally called a sympathetic strike, has probably been in existence for a quarter of a century. The name is, however, of more recent date, and has been reached by a process of natural selection. At first, owing to the resemblance between a general and a sympathetic strike, the former word was used to describe both indiscriminately. Later, when the desirability of a distinction became apparent, various phrases were tried. Such strikes were called "general strikes to enforce particular

claims,"¹ "adhesive strikes,"² "strikes on principle,"³ "assistance strikes,"⁴ strikes "out of sympathy" or "on sympathy;" but the simpler phrase, sympathetic strike, used first about the time of the strike on the Southwestern Railroad system in 1886,⁵ has now supplanted all others, though it is only within the last two years that the term has entirely emerged from quotation marks—the swaddling clothes which betrayed its infancy.⁶

Although the term sympathetic strike has now attained a sufficiently definite meaning, it is often made to include strikes which cannot properly be called sympathetic. The so-called general strikes are not necessarily sympathetic. In 1886 there were numerous strikes throughout this country, sometimes comprising several localities, often including all the trades of one locality. The action was more or less pre-concerted and carefully planned, but all the strikers had some grievance. In fact they all had the same grievance. They were fighting for the eight-hour day. Their action was general, but not sympathetic.⁷

There is another class of strikes sometimes confused with sympathetic strikes. They may be called, for lack of a better name, contagious strikes. The business depression of 1876 caused great suffering among the laboring classes of this country. Their wages had reached the striking point in 1877. The beginning was made by the employees of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the impulse quickly spread to the Pennsylvania system. In an incredibly short time strikes had taken place in Maryland, Pennsylvania, West

¹ *Saturday Review*, v. 70, p. 472.

² *Economic Journal*, v. 3, p. 725.

³ Smith and Nash, *The Dockers' Strike*, p. 8.

⁴ *House Reports*, 49th Congress, 2d Session, v. i part i, p. 184.

⁵ *Public Opinion*, v. 4, p. 59.

⁶ *Spectator* (1896), v. 77, p. 105.

Bradstreets, v. 13, p. 290.

Virginia, Ohio, New York, New Jersey, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Kentucky and Missouri. The movement was not confined to railroad men. Other industries soon became involved, and factories of all descriptions lay idle.¹ In these strikes there was an undoubted sympathy between the strikers, but they were not sympathetic strikes in any proper sense, for the underlying motive prompting the strike was not sympathy with abused fellow workmen, but was grievances felt by the strikers themselves. The cause of contagious strikes is psychological rather than economic. The "strike fever" gets into the body of labor, and a "mania for strikes" is the result. It is usually impossible to discover any economic foundation whatever.

There is still another class of strikes nearly related to sympathetic strikes, though not identical with them. They may perhaps be called compulsory strikes. This compulsion assumes two different forms. It may be an unavoidable result of the original cessation of work. A strike of thirty-two engine-men in an English colliery, in 1891, threw two thousand miners out of work. During that year 24 per cent. of those out of work because of strikes were so against their will²—were in this sense, compulsory strikers. There is also a violent sort of compulsory strike, which is still quite common where police protection is insufficient or is delayed. In May, 1894, the miners in the vicinity of Denver were out on a strike for higher wages. Feeling that their chance of success would increase with their numbers, they organized a so-called "army of intimidation." Seizing and fortifying a certain hill as a sort of rendezvous, they made repeated sallies upon the mines in the neighborhood, forcing the un-

¹ Dacus, *Annals of the Great Strikes*; also, *Third Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor*, 1887, p. 1071.

² *Strikes and Lockouts in 1891*, p. 28. (Parl. Papers, 1893-1894, v. lxxxiii Part i.)

willing into their ranks by free use of pistols, clubs and stones.¹ Such strikers are plainly not sympathetic strikers. In many cases, however, it is more difficult to decide whether the threats of the visiting strikers intimidate the men into declaring a "compulsory strike" or whether the arguments of the visitors persuade them into declaring a sympathetic strike.

Exactly what constitutes a sympathetic strike must now be plain. Such a strike occurs when workmen "having no grievance of their own take action out of a belief that another body of workers is not fairly treated, and so take up the cause."²

One word in this definition requires explanation. Sympathetic strikers, it is asserted, have no "grievance" against their employers. Presumably they have no personal interest in the outcome of their strike, no axe of their own to grind. But this is never the case. Sympathetic strikers always expect to have the favor returned when their need arises, and have at least this much of personal interest in the result of their "sympathetic" strike. The essential feature of such strikes, moreover, is not the entire lack of advantage which the striker expects to gain from his action. A sympathetic strike receives its name not so much because its motive is sympathy only—there has never yet been an over-production of simon-pure sympathy in the matter of strikes—but because its motive is not selfish only. Altruism is necessarily present in a sympathetic strike, but beneath it all is the consciousness that "an injury to one is the concern of all."³ The benefits gained by

¹ *Contemporary Review*, v. 66, p. 74.

² *Report of the Bureau of Statistics of Labor of the State of New York*, 1890, Part i, p. 935.

³ This altruistic element is emphasized in the expression sympathetic strike, but is entirely ignored in the name which the French have given to the same phenomenon. ("Grève par solidarité, sans demande spéciale." *Statistique des*

an ordinary striker accrue to him first, and to others only through him; while, with sympathetic strikers, the process is exactly reversed. Their personal advantage is subordinated in time, and usually too in degree, to the advantage of their fellows. The ordinary striker protests against an injury which he already feels, or which threatens to affect him at a definite time in the future. A sympathetic striker protests against an injury which affects, or definitely threatens to affect, some fellow workmen, but which, he believes, will affect himself at some more or less indefinite time in the future. Expressed in terms of economic theory, the striker works for present and the sympathetic striker for future goods.

It is obvious, however, that no "working definition" can be made to rest upon so variable a distinction. In proportion as the benefit to be derived from a strike becomes less distant and indefinite, it would become less truly a sympathetic strike. A great borderland of difficulty is thus revealed, where it would be next to impossible to apply the criterion of sympathy—or its reverse, the immediateness of advantage—in order to classify strikes as sympathetic or not. A more practical criterion is found in the nature of the dispute which causes the strike in question. In a strike of the ordinary type, the dispute concerns the mutual relation of the disputants, while in a sympathetic strike, it does not. Sympathetic strikers object, not to their employers attitude toward *them*, but to his attitude toward *certain other parties*,—an attitude which is hostile to labor. He refuses a living wage, it may be, to the women in the establishment—a directly hostile attitude toward labor in general; or he assists, in some way, a fellow employer involved in a strike, and thus indirectly attacks the cause.

Grèves, 1893, p. 152.) In his "Government by Injunction," (*Economic Studies*, *American Economic Association*, vol. iii, no. i, page 9.) Mr. Dunbar speaks of the "so-called sympathetic strikes."

In this sense, therefore, sympathetic strikers may be said to have "no grievance" against their employers. There may be a dispute, but unless it concerns the mutual relations of the disputants, no grievance exists. The dispute which precipitated the railroad strikes at Chicago in 1894 concerned the hauling of Pullman cars. Manifestly this did not involve the mutual relations between the railroad companies and their men. The latter, therefore, had no grievance, and their strike was sympathetic.

The phrase "sympathetic lockout" has not yet found a place in the English language.¹ A place is assured for it, however, for the phenomenon is as distinctive as the sympathetic strike, and is its exact counterpart. In fact, as will be shown later, the sympathetic lockout antedates the sympathetic strike by at least a quarter of a century, although it has always been called a lockout merely. A sympathetic lockout occurs when an employer discharges men against whom he has no grievance, in order thus to enforce the settlement of some other dispute. As in the case of sympathetic strikes, the employer may have a dispute with his men, but it is not a dispute which concerns the mutual relations between him and them, and can not, therefore, be said to constitute a grievance. Disputes which may thus precipitate a sympathetic lockout are always of one type, and, therefore, require but little explanation at this point. The employer demands that his men shall cease contributing to the support of men on a strike. The employees refuse, and the sympathetic lockout begins.

¹The phrase was used by the London correspondent of the *New York Evening Post*, July 17, 1897, in regard to the engineering dispute. More than a year previously, however, I had used the expression in a paper upon the subject, an interesting indication that the distinction is really demanded.

The distinction which has just been explained between a sympathetic strike and a sympathetic lockout implies an equally marked distinction between a strike and lockout of the ordinary type. As a matter of fact this latter distinction is a very difficult one to draw. There is but little agreement among writers. One prominent statistician, becoming hopelessly involved in the difficulties which invariably arise when the attempt is made to apply any distinction to actual disputes, has made unconditional surrender. Such an unsettled condition in regard to fundamental terms is remarkable, and warrants consideration in this place, although its bearing upon the sympathetic movement is only slight.

The phenomenon strike is as old as the Israelitish insurrection in Egypt, though the word has probably not had its present technical meaning much more than a century—since the Industrial Revolution in fact. The expression lockout is of even more recent origin. The earliest use which I have been able to discover is in the Report upon Trade Societies and Strikes prepared for the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, and presented at the annual meeting of that body in Glasgow in 1860. In this Report the word is used almost exclusively to describe the phenomenon more properly called a *sympathetic* lockout. The doors were closed upon men who were not involved in the original dispute, but who were supposed to be assisting the original strikers. This was the common meaning of the expression as late as 1870.¹ Mr. George Potter, writing in that year, classifies strikes as “aggressive” and “defensive,” according as the initiative rests with the men or with their masters. A “defensive strike” would to-day be

¹One of the most eminent authorities on the subject of labor, Dr. Brentano, discussed the lockout in 1876 at considerable length but used the word always in its original meaning of sympathetic lockout. (*Relation of Labor to Law of To-day*, p. 131.)

called a lockout. But a lockout, Mr. Potter insists, is something entirely different from either of these. He then describes the sympathetic lockout.¹ From this it is plain that the original meaning of the expression lockout was much narrower than that in use to-day. By 1880 the widening process seems to have begun. Mr. Joseph D. Weeks, writing in that year, describes the sympathetic lockout and adds,

"This would be a lockout, and it is only with reference to such lockouts that the word is frequently used. However, the broader signification, which includes all stoppages of work resulting from a demand or other action of the employers, is to be preferred."²

The door had been opened and trouble at once began. An Alliance of Organized Trades had been formed in England in order "to support the members of any trade who should find themselves locked out by their employers." The organization was wrecked, however, because its judicial council was unable to decide "what constituted a lockout as distinguished from a strike." Almost every union found it both easy and desirable to call the dispute in which it was involved a lockout rather than a strike.³

The reason for the coinage of the expression lockout and for its subsequent extension in meaning are equally plain. The discharge of men against whom their employers had no grievance could not possibly be called a strike. It was a new thing under the sun and demanded a new name. The picturesque word lockout met the requirements exactly. But an entirely different motive underlay the extension of the word's meaning. Strikes had been increasingly common in England since the repeal of the combination laws

¹ *The Contemporary Review*, 1870; v. 15, pp. 37 and 38.

² *The Tenth Census of the United States*, v. 20. Report on Strikes and Lockouts during 1880, p. 4.

³ Webb, *History of Trade Unionism*, p. 241.

in 1824. They were bitterly denounced because of the injury they inflicted upon all classes of society. The brunt of these denunciations naturally fell upon the unions. The interruption was a strike. Only workmen can strike. *Ergo*, strikes were caused by workmen. The responsibility for the disturbance was thus laid at their door by the very nature of the name it bore. In this way the workmen's cause was often misrepresented to those who knew no more of the trouble than its name. A most natural way in which to avoid such misjudgment was to call the dispute in question a lockout instead of a strike. This name on its very face declared the employer the responsible party in exactly the same way as the term strike had condemned the workmen.

As soon as this extension in the meaning of the term lockout had begun, the possibilities of further extension became limitless. In the hands of the Knights of Labor these possibilities have all been realized. One hundred and forty iron-workers in St. Louis in 1887 demanded a 10 per cent. increase in wages. Their employers refused and the result was a lockout, according to the Knights.¹ Unionists rarely go to such extremes, however. In many cases they have accepted the old word, admitting that the dispute is a strike. Other cases they insist are lockouts. Disputes of this latter type originate usually with an announcement on the part of the employer of some new arrangements in regard to the future. He intends a wage reduction, he will employ only non-union men, he will confer with his men as individuals, but no longer with union representatives. When such arrangements are refused by the workmen, the interruption is a lockout. It has been *caused* by the employer in question. He has taken the initiative. As long as the term lockout was confined to its original meaning—the

¹ *Report of the Bureau of Statistics of Labor of the State of New York, 1887* p. 297.

meaning of *sympathetic* lockout—it was accepted by the employers, but they denied the propriety of using the new term in regard to disputes of the sort just described. The men who refused to accept their employer's terms, "struck" against those terms. They were not locked out at all.

From the foregoing it appears that, historically, a large number of disputes have been called both strikes and lockouts, the name being merely used as a means to fix responsibility for the injury which the disturbance caused. That this is the real motive behind the distinction was indicated by a very casual remark made by a witness before the Senate Committee, which investigated the Reading strike of 1887. He claimed that certain peculiar circumstances made the railroad desire a cessation at that time, that the Company had, therefore, goaded the men into a strike *in order that the dispute might receive that name rather than a lockout.*¹

When statistics of strikes were first collected, the distinction had become fairly well established. Newspapers used the new word, and the statisticians arranged their schedules accordingly. Commissioner Wright, in his first report upon the subject, followed the distinction just explained. A strike occurs, he said,

"when the employees of an establishment refuse to work unless the management complies with some demand. A lockout occurs when the management refuses to allow the employees to work unless they will work under some condition dictated by the management. In effect, strikes and lockouts are practically the same thing, the disturbances simply originating with one side or the other in the case."²

No other report was issued by the United States upon the subject of strikes until 1894. During this period the English Board of Trade had begun an annual investigation of

¹ *Labor Troubles in Pennsylvania*, p. xcix. (House Report, no. 4147, 50th Cong., 2d Session.)

² *Third Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor*, 1887, p. 9.

the subject. In 1888 Mr. Burnett, the "Labour Correspondent," defined a lockout as follows:

"The lockout is the action of an employer who notifies his work-people that on a certain date all existing contracts for service shall terminate, and who lays down no definite proposal for the continuation of such contracts; or (2) who closes his works to compel his men to cease to be members of a Union; or (3) to increase the difficulties of a strike organization fighting with other employers, by increasing the number of those it will have to support."¹

Each part of this definition requires separate attention. The first species of dispute described is evidently neither a strike nor a lockout. It is a dismissal merely—a discharge. No opportunity is given to the workmen to continue in their employer's service on any terms. The essential feature of a strike or lockout, the use of the cessation of work to extort concessions, is entirely lacking in such cases. The third type of dispute which Mr. Burnett describes as a lockout is easily recognized as a sympathetic lockout. The men locked out have no disagreement with their employer. The aim of the lockout is to cause financial embarrassment to strikers elsewhere. It is thus an entirely different phenomenon from the simple lockout. When these two parts of the definition have been removed very little remains. A lockout is merely an attempt to enforce the abandonment of the union. The employer demands it, the employees refuse, and a cessation of work is the means relied upon to effect a settlement. For the present, it may be admitted that such disputes are properly called lockouts. It was when the attempt was made to apply this three-fold definition to actual disputes that trouble began. In 1894, Mr. Burnett gave up the attempt in the following words:

"Very often it was found difficult to decide under which category

¹ *Strikes and Lockouts in 1888*, p. 5. (Parl. Papers, 1889, v. lxx.)

a dispute should be placed. Sometimes both the characteristics of a lockout and a strike entered into the same dispute and often the two parties held distinctly opposite opinions as to the head under which the dispute should be classed. It has, therefore, been thought not desirable to maintain the distinction."¹

All cessations of work for coercive purposes are now recorded in the English reports as "Disputes" merely.

Commissioner Wright has experienced the same difficulty, although the distinction was still preserved in the Report issued by the Labor Department in 1894. In the introduction to this Report he says :

"Some difficulty has been experienced in classifying certain of these disturbances owing to inadequate information as to their causes, and because of the very slight difference between a strike and a lockout as mentioned above."

The difficulties of the statisticians to attain a satisfactory distinction are thus on record in their reports, but the struggles of the laboring classes with the problem must be observed in the amusing mazes in which they often become involved when the two words are used. The author of the following resolution evidently regards the lockout as a penalty inflicted by the men upon their employers, in order to bring the latter to terms.

"*Resolved*, That this meeting of delegates after taking in consideration the extent of the lockout, do hereby pledge ourselves, and (we) will not return to work for any of the firms struck or locked out, until our demands are granted ; and also that any firm or firms who have been partially locked out shall be considered as closed."²

According to Levasseur, "l' usine fermée brusquement ou après avertissement préalable par le patron qui ne veut pas

¹ *Strikes and Lockouts in 1894*, p. 9. (Parl. Papers, 1895, v. xcii.)

² *Strikes and Lockouts in 1891*, p. 268. (Parl. Papers, 1893-1894, v. lxxxiii, part i.)

travailler est dans le cas du 'lockout.' . . . C'est une arme que ceux-ci opposent aux prétentions de leurs ouvriers qui leur paraissent inacceptables."¹ But this gives no further light. It is substantially Commissioner Wright's definition. It is strange that no definition of a lockout appears in any of the law dictionaries. The one legal writer who has attempted a definition reaches the very remarkable conclusion that a lockout is the act of preventing persons who desire to work from doing so. A lockout may, therefore, "be the act of either the employer or the employees."²

The difficulty of definition apparent in all these cases is fundamental. It reveals the fact which is obscured by the very attempts at distinction—the fact that neither side can be said to *cause* a strike or lockout any more than one boy can cause a fight. It takes two in both cases. The most which can be charged to either party is that it has taken the first step, the initiative. Such a distinction is possible theoretically, although it becomes a very difficult one in practice. In view of this difficulty, it is fair to demand that the distinction when drawn shall possess some considerable value—shall lead somewhere. Mr. Burnett practically admits in the words quoted above that it has no such value.³ The reason is plain. All disputes deal with the terms and conditions of future employment. Logically it makes no

¹ *L' Ouvrier Américain*, v. i, p. 558.

² T. S. Cogley, *The Law of Strikes, Lockouts and Labor Organizations*, pp. 4-6.

³ In the small number of cases where the interruption of work is accompanied by a breach of contract on the part of either master or men, the distinction may perhaps be of value. "If an employer dismissed his men without giving them due notice, there would be a lockout; while if the men left their work without giving their employers due notice, there would be a strike. But where the contract has been legally terminated, and the quarrel simply resolves itself into a failure to come to terms concerning a new contract, the state of affairs may be described as either a strike or a lockout indifferently." (T. J. Spyers, *The Labor Question*, p. 17.)

difference whether these conditions are the same as those which the men have endured for years, and now desire to endure no longer, and strike, as it is termed, or whether the new conditions of employment are in the nature of a change which the employer wishes to inaugurate—the so-called lockout. Disputes which refer to questions of unionism, even the question of the abandonment of a union—Mr. Burnett's criterion for a lockout—stand, in this regard, on the same footing with attempts of all other sorts. When the abandonment of the union is at stake there is, of course, no difficulty in determining the question of initiative. Calling the dispute a lockout may, therefore, indicate that, but it can indicate nothing more. The employees *cause* the cessation by refusing to abandon the union, just as truly as the employer causes it by making the demand. Disputes of this sort do not differ in principle from any others.

For clearness the conclusions reached thus far may be repeated at this point. With sympathetic lockouts left out of consideration, the only distinction which remains between a strike and a lockout is that of initiative. If this distinction is drawn, the investigator is informed in how many cases the men make the first objection to a continuance of their previous relations, and "strike" in order to enforce a change for the better; and in how many instances the employers object to the existing regime, and lock out their men in order to gain the change desired. The investigator learns, in a word, which side is satisfied that the present relations shall continue, and which desires a change. Such information neither proves anything of itself, nor assists in the proof of any other proposition of value.

But the valuelessness of the distinction is its least objectionable feature. It is more than useless. It is mischievous. This mischievous character arises from the use of the words to imply a distinction far broader than that of initi-

ative merely. If, by calling a dispute a lockout, the only impression given were the true one—that the employer is the party dissatisfied with the existing relations and desirous of a change—there could be no objection to the use of the term. But this is not the case. When a dispute has received the name lockout, it is generally believed that the employer has in some way caused it. The responsibility for all the injury entailed is laid to his charge. Thus the entire merits of the dispute, from the point of view of its justice are prejudged in the very name it bears. The reverse is also true when a dispute becomes officially recognized as a strike. The very failure to put it into the category of lockouts when such a category exists, is of itself, an admission that the responsibility belongs to the men. That responsibility does not follow initiative needs only to be stated to be proved. And yet the logic by means of which this sequence is evolved in the popular mind is not so absurd as it first seems. It has been shown above how the word lockout derived a meaning which it did not possess at first, in order that it might be used to fix this question of responsibility. Whenever the word is used at present by the champions of labor it has this meaning. The public, therefore, naturally expects the same meaning when the word is used in official publications. It instinctively realizes the meaninglessness of the mere question of initiative. It assumes that the distinction must be of a more decided, more decisive character—must, in fact, settle roughly this question of responsibility.

The injustice which is done to both sides in many cases by thus identifying the initiating and the responsible party, is apparent when actual cases are examined. The workmen who are employed at mere subsistence wages, and who see winter approaching with its increased cost of living, are hardly responsible for the interruption of work which their

strike entails, although the initiative rests with them without a doubt. In other cases it is the employer who suffers at the hands of the distinction. Wage reductions are an absolute necessity at times. A refusal to accept such a reduction, precipitates a cessation of work for which the workmen are undoubtedly more responsible than the employer is. If, however, the test of initiative is applied the dispute becomes a lockout, and all who know no more of the matter than the name naturally regard the employer as the party to be condemned. This unfairness appears in its most objectionable form in the grand summaries of strikes and lockouts, which appear in the Reports of the Labor Department of this country upon the subject. During the seven and a half years covered by the last report, over 10,000 strikes were reported, involving nearly 47,000 establishments;¹ while, during the same period, there were but 442 lockouts, involving but 3,853 establishments²—evidently a bad showing for the workmen if the merits of the dispute are really settled by the name it bears. For many reasons, therefore, the decision of Mr. Burnett to abandon all attempt at distinction between strikes and lockouts, and to enter both under the general heading of disputes, is to be commended. The distinction has its value in the hands of partisans, and is sure to be perpetuated there. The foregoing pages are intended, however, as a protest against its use in classifications which are scientific in their aim.

If the above contention is admitted—that the distinction between a strike and a lockout is both valueless and mischievous—it may be asked if the same characterization applies to the sympathetic extensions of a dispute. Is it necessary to abandon the distinction between a sympathetic

¹ *Tenth Annual Report*, v. ii, p. 1564.

² *Ibid.*, v. ii, p. 1660.

strike and a sympathetic lockout? In my opinion it is not. It is true that the arguments used above to prove that an employer is not responsible for a simple lockout, might be used here to prove that he is no more responsible for a sympathetic lockout. As in the simple dispute, so here, he merely takes the first step. When he demands that his men cease contributing to strikers elsewhere, he has not caused the cessation. The demand must be refused by the workmen before the interruption takes place. As before, it is merely a question of initiative, but initiative has a meaning and an importance in sympathetic disturbances which is entirely lacking in their original counterparts. This difference in the meaning and importance of the question of initiative is here made to justify the retention of the distinction in the case of sympathetic disturbances.

In a sympathetic lockout the employer invades, as it were, the private life of his men. The demand which he makes upon them and which they may concede and thus avoid the disturbance, does not as in the simple dispute concern relations between himself and them. It concerns relations which his men wish to assume or are assuming toward other men. When such demands cause a cessation of work, it is undoubtedly fair to assume that the responsibility for the cessation rests with the employer for making the demand rather than with the men for refusing it. Any other assumption would lead to astonishing results. If an employer demands that his workmen shall not contribute to strikers elsewhere, why should he not demand that they purchase no newspapers which are hostile to the employing classes, or that they shall vote for a candidate who happens to be his friend? Such demands stand all on a plane; and when an employer, in establishing new conditions for future employment, enters this realm, he takes a step which may with far more propriety be said to *cause* the cessation than when he

confines his demands to matters which concern merely his employees' relations to himself. The invasion of the private affairs of an employer by the initiators of a sympathetic strike, is sometimes as equally marked as the sympathetic lockout invasion just described. If certain workmen object to the attitude which their employer assumes toward other workmen or other employers even, why should they not insist that he wear no hats which are without the union label, or that his wife should trade at only "white-list" stores?

It is fair, therefore, to allow the responsibility for a sympathetic cessation of work to rest with the initiator of such a disturbance, and to allow this question of responsibility to be indicated by making the distinction between the sympathetic strike and the sympathetic lockout.

CHAPTER II

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

SYMPATHETIC strikes have had a two-fold origin. An economic necessity prompted the appeal for sympathetic help, just at the time when a willingness to help in so substantial a way had been developed among the laboring classes. This "appeal for help" regards the sympathetic strike from the standpoint of the original striker, and presents the question "Why have such appeals come so much in vogue during the last few years?" The opposite standpoint—that of the men who declare the sympathetic strike—must be taken in order to explain its possibility—why were they willing to make such sacrifice for the benefit of their fellows?

Before an answer can be given to the former question, it is necessary to understand the exact nature of the pressure exerted by strikes of the ordinary type, for it is only because this pressure has become weakened during the last quarter of a century that sympathetic strikes have become necessary. All such pressure is based upon the following fact which must be regarded as fundamental. When a strike causes a total cessation of work in the establishment involved, the maximum of lawful injury upon the employer has been inflicted. How great such an injury may be is not often appreciated. Production ceases, profits vanish, but fixed charges, sometimes enormous in amount, continue. Interest, insurance and taxes must all be paid, and often it is necessary to continue to pay large salaries to the

more important assistants in order to retain them. The probability, too, is strong that trade, alienated temporarily because of the strike, will much of it never return. An employer often has contracts on hand which must be completed at a given time, and he may be prosecuted for failure in this regard.¹ This inability to fill contracts seems, in many cases, to be one of the severest injuries which employers receive from the enforced idleness of their establishments. Chartered companies are practically under contract with the government to continue their business, and it is an open question whether the injunction may not be used to force them to do so even if it involves a submission to the demands of the men.²

The complete cessation of work in the establishment is, therefore, the one purpose of the original strike. When production has ceased, strikers can do no more without violation of the law. The employer may continue to live out of his accumulated capital, but injury to such a resource is beyond the strikers' power. When a strike has been declared, therefore, the efforts of the workmen are directed toward inflicting this maximum of injury—the complete idleness of their employer's plant. To this end they aim, first, to prevent his getting other workmen—by a system of careful picketing, and, secondly, when this device has failed, to prevent his using the workmen obtained in spite of the pickets, by a system of sympathetic strikes. The sympathetic strike, therefore, appears to be unnecessary as long as picketing answers its purpose. In the early days of strikes, the power of picketing was great. It was practically synonymous with intimidation and often with violence. Wherever

¹ In some contracts, especially in the building trades, there is a stipulation that, in case of a strike, the obligation is not binding. But competition among contractors causes the omission of this stipulation in many cases.

² *Forum*, v. 15, p. 311.

such practices were possible, the chances were slight that an employer could fill the places of his striking workmen. The last twenty years, however, have witnessed a continually stricter enforcement of the law, on the part of governments, against any strikers inclined to resort to picketing of the violent sort, and a continually stricter interpretation by the courts of the meaning of the word intimidation as applied to the practice of picketing. The result of all this has been greatly to weaken the power of picketing. In all industries where a low grade of skill is required, it has become possible and at times even easy to supply the strikers' places, and thus ward off their only weapon. Some other means of enforcing the "maximum injury" had to be devised, and the sympathetic strike was the result.

The various methods by which such strikes are used to accomplish this purpose will be discussed in the following chapter. It remains at this point to examine the rise of sympathetic strikes from the opposite standpoint—that of the men who declare them. It has already been shown that sympathy cannot be regarded as the sole or even the principal motive for sympathetic strikes. An increased willingness to declare such strikes cannot, therefore, have been the result of an ethical development on the part of the working classes. On the contrary, it is more nearly true to say that the workmen of to-day are more willing temporarily to sacrifice their all for the benefit of their fellows, not because they are more fully possessed with a spirit of brotherly love, but because they know more. An intellectual rather than a moral change has been the cause. Sympathetic strikers work for "future goods"—a habit which requires no little intelligence at its back. Prevision in industrial matters is essentially an intellectual process. Such prevision has developed among the working classes of England and the United States *pari passu* with their material and intellectual

progress during the last quarter of a century, and is one of the two underlying causes of the sympathetic strike. That "the good of one is the concern of all" appealed less to the workingmen of the last generation than it does to those of to-day, not because their sympathies were any more narrow in the first case, but simply because they were less able to understand it. To sacrifice their scanty earnings in order to assist strikers of whom they knew nothing, seemed absurd. The possibility that ultimately the result of their dispute might react to their advantage or disadvantage exceeded their comprehension. The gradual development of this comprehension showed itself first in a willingness to give financial assistance to fellow-workmen engaged in a strike. The success of a neighboring strike was worth something—worth contributing to, but it was not worth everything—worth striking for. Contributions take but a part of a man's income, while to strike in sympathy absorbs it all.

There appears, therefore, a long period in the history of strikes during which financial sympathy developed extensively, but when a "striking sympathy" was practically unknown. The £30,000 sent from Australia for the assistance of the London dockers in 1889, was remarkable only because of the magnitude of the contribution and the distance from which it came. In 1810 the striking spinners in the vicinity of Manchester received £75 weekly from the Manchester spinners,¹ while during the strike at Preston in 1850, over £5,000 was subscribed, largely by fellow-laborers.² During all this period a union which refused to "assist" another came at once into bad repute. But "assistance" in those days always meant financial assistance. To-day it may mean that, but it often means more,

¹ *The Quarterly Review*, v. 106, p. 495.

² *Journal of the Statistical Society of London*, v. 30, p. 13.

and a certain ambiguity has arisen for this reason. At the meeting of the Royal Statistical Society held in 1890, Mr. L. L. Price and Mr. George Howell became involved in a considerable discussion without once answering each other's arguments, merely because this word was used in the two different senses by the two men. Mr. Howell meant financial assistance while Mr. Price referred to assistance by means of another strike.¹

It was in this country that a "striking sympathy" first began to supplant "financial sympathy," and it is interesting to note the form which these early sympathetic strikes assumed. The first great sympathetic strike—on the South-western system in 1886—was intended to enforce the reinstatement of a union official, while the last great struggle of this sort—at Chicago in 1894—was in sympathy with a wage dispute at Pullman. These two classes of disputes differ in the amount of advantage which the sympathetic strikers can see for themselves if the original strike is made to succeed. Disputes of the former type were the first to develop, because this advantage is greatest in those cases, and is most easily understood. In so far as the outcome of a given strike has a directly encouraging or discouraging influence upon employers not involved, it is plainly to the interests of all men in the service of these employers to see that the original strike shall not fail. But this influence varies greatly. It is least in those cases where the dispute concerns conditions of employment, such as wages and hours, and is greatest in regard to disputes which involve questions of unionism—the employment of only union men, the recognition of the union, etc. In the first case a successful strike has a direct and discouraging effect not on all employers but only on those engaged in a similar line of industry and under similar conditions. The failure of the strike of the English machin-

¹ *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, v. 53, pages 431, 452, 459.

ists for the eight hour day, has but the slightest influence upon any similar effort which may be made in this country. The conditions which might make it possible for employers to grant such a concession are entirely different in the two cases. No more would the outcome of this strike have any very great influence upon an effort which the English textile operators might make for a shorter day, and for precisely the same reason. The influence exerted by the success or failure of a strike declared for these purposes is thus limited by both trade and geographical lines. When men outside these limits declare a sympathetic strike, the amount of advantage they hope to gain for themselves is exceedingly slight and hazy. On the other hand, a victory on the question of the employment of only union men is limited by neither geographical nor trade lines. What one employer consents to do in such matters, all can do. So unionists argue and naturally. The striker, therefore, who assists another to defend a union principle sees a much more immediate advantage to be gained than was possible in the preceding case.¹

A remark made before the New South Wales Commission by the President of the Trades and Labor Council of Sydney indicates that this distinction has more than an academic value. The cause of the original strike in Australia was, it will be remembered, a question of unionism—the right to affiliate with other organizations. In regard to the sympathetic extension which followed that strike the witness said, “It would not have been possible to have confined the strike to wharf laborers alone. It would necessarily follow that one society would support the others, for a principle of unionism was involved.”² The implication is

¹ This element of personal advantage appears at its greatest when the men originally attacked belong to the same union with those who strike in their behalf.

² Report of the Royal Commission of New South Wales on Strikes, 1891, Evidence, Q's. 3804-5.

plain that it might have been possible or advisable to have discouraged sympathetic striking if the original grievance had been of a local character—had concerned wages or hours, but that in his opinion the sympathetic extension was indispensable in the case considered because the original grievance was a matter of such universal concern.

Although sympathetic strikes were uncommon until fifteen or twenty years ago, they were by no means unknown. The strike of the New York cord-wainers, famous on account of the conspiracy case which grew out of it, seems to have been a sympathetic strike. The proprietor originally involved transferred his work to other shops, thus precipitating a strike against all proprietors.¹ According to McNeill, the caulkers of Boston in 1866 refused to do certain work for their employers, on the ground that it was intended to help certain other employers in New York whose men were on a strike, and were discharged.² A sympathetic strike was declared in 1873 among the employees of five newspapers in Pittsburgh, because the proprietors in two instances insisted upon using non-union men.³ During the great strike of the telegraphers in 1883, an attempt was made to secure the strike of all railroad employees, but without success.⁴ During the boycott of the Wabash Railroad Company by the Knights of Labor in 1885, the general executive board declared that

“All Knights of Labor in the employ of the Union Pacific, Gould’s Southwestern System or any other railroad must refuse to repair or handle in any manner Wabash rolling stock, and if this order is an-

¹ A History of Strikes in America, two articles by A. A. Freeman in *The Engineering Magazine*, v. 6, (1893-1894).

² *The Labor Movement*, pages 350-353.

³ *Report of the Secretary of Internal Affairs*, Pennsylvania, 1880-1881, part iii, p. 305.

⁴ *The Nation*, v. 37, p. 110.

tagonized by the companies, your executive is hereby ordered to call out all Knights of Labor on the above systems."¹

These are all isolated examples however. The unimportance of the movement as late as 1885 is indicated by the fact that the New York State Labor Report of that year enumerates the causes of strikes in a list some twelve pages long without once mentioning "sympathy" or "assistance."² The sympathetic strike movement really began with the strike on the Southwestern railroad system in 1886. During this and the next two years, strikes of this sort multiplied with great rapidity. One of the earliest recognitions of the new regime appeared in the *Boston Advertiser* during 1887.³

"The great labor agitation has produced a crop of strikes. Generally they have been failures. Why? Simply because they were not well grounded. Thousands of men have left work because a few demanded better wages. Employers who have had naught but the pleasantest relations with their workingmen have suddenly found themselves waited upon by outsiders with demands which they could not grant and for which their men had never asked."

Unions not only act upon the principle, but openly avow the policy. The following statement appeared in 1886 in an anonymous compilation, which, however, has Mr. Powderly's picture as a frontispiece:

"The last resort of the order is to put under the ban the goods or the business of any firm, company or person using the goods or helping the business of the object of the original boycott. It is the cause of the blockade on the Southwestern System, where the sins of the Texas and Pacific are being visited upon all its connecting lines."⁴

The development of sympathetic strikes since 1886 is indicated somewhat by the statistics which the Department of Labor has collected upon the subject. The number of establishments involved in sympathetic strikes from January

¹ *House Reports*, 49th Congress, 2d Session, v. iii, part i, p. 6. ²p. 296.

³ Quoted in *Public Opinion*, v. 6, p. 524. ⁴ *Labor, its Rights and Wrongs*, p. 21.

1, 1881, to July 1, 1894, is shown by the following table.¹ The number of establishments involved in strikes of all sorts is also given for the sake of comparison.

Year	Total Establishments	Sym. Strikes—Establishments	Per cent. which are Sym. Strikes—Establishments
1881	2,928	4	.13
1882	2,105	4	.19
1883	2,759	3	.10
1884	2,367	27	1.14
1885	2,284	37	1.61
1886	10,053	170	1.69
1887	6,589	312	4.73
1888	3,506	161	4.59
1889	3,786	109	2.87
1890	9,424	799	8.47
1891	8,116	566	6.97
1892	5,540	425	7.67
1893	4,555	277	6.08
1894 (6 mo.) ..	5,154	1,512	29.33
Total	69,166	4,406	6.37

¹ In preparing this table strikes with several different assigned causes have been included as sympathetic strikes. These, with the number of establishments affected in each instance, are as follows:

Against filling orders for mines in which a strike was pending	2
Against firm supplying goods to boycotted establishment.....	2
Against handling cars of road on which strike was pending.....	15
Against using carts from a yard in which a strike was pending	2
Against use of boycotted machinery.....	1
Against use of boycotted material.....	59
Against use of boycotted patterns.....	10
Against use of material from establishment in which strike was pending...	5
Against use of material from non-union establishment	168
Against performing work for another establishment in which strike or lock-out was pending	73
Against performing work for non-union establishment.....	3
For employer to remain neutral in strike pending in another establishment.	1
In sympathy with strike elsewhere	3,793
In sympathy with strike in the same establishment	15
In sympathy with lockout elsewhere.....	251

This table indicates very plainly the importance which sympathetic strikes have assumed in this country. In one respect, however, the figures probably give a wrong impression. If the Chicago strike and the great coal strike of 1894 are eliminated from the figures given for that year, the number of establishments affected proves to have been but 90. It is fair to make such an elimination, for the two strikes mentioned were exceptional in many respects, and especially so in the matter of size. It would thus appear that there has been a steady decline in the number of sympathetic strikes since 1890. All outside indications point in the same direction. The stronghold of sympathetic strikes as a regular policy is New York State, but even here, according to the Board of Arbitration and Conciliation, "workmen are becoming less disposed to proceed to these extreme measures than formerly, it being plain that such strikes are in a majority of instances unsuccessful."¹

In England the sympathetic strike movement was very short lived. It originated properly in 1889 with the strike at the London docks, although a strike in Manchester as early as 1824 was undoubtedly sympathetic in its character.² In 1858 certain glass making firms of Stowebridge, which were involved in a strike, were supplied by other firms with the goods which they needed. To prevent this assistance, workmen in these other firms threatened to strike, and were only prevented from doing so by the action of the employers in inaugurating a general lockout.³ During the year following, the chain makers in a factory at Newcastle declared a sympathetic strike lasting four weeks, for this

¹ *Report*, 1895, p. 20.

² "The object of the strike was to raise wages in the country districts to a level with those in Manchester" (J. Ward, *Workmen and Wages*, p. 21.), and yet the Manchester workmen joined in the strike.

³ *The Co-operative Wholesale Societies Annual*, 1889, p. 299.

same reason.¹ It thus appears that the sympathetic strike was "not new" in 1889, but it had "never been so frequently resorted to" as during that year and in the case of the dockers' strike, it was "undoubtedly used to great effect."² This strike inaugurated the last of those "New Unionisms" which have been periodic in England.³ Its supporters decried the benefit features of the older unions and insisted that the "day of strikes" had not passed. Sympathetic strikes were advised on the ground that it was only by this means that unskilled labor could hope for success in contests with their masters. Commenting upon this policy, the *Saturday Review* remarked in 1890 as follows:

"Up to the time of the famous Docker demonstration the thought that Trades-Unions might some day form into a federal body with intent to enforce particular claims with all the force of a general strike, disturbed nobody very much. From the London Dock Strike, however, it appeared that combinations of this formidable kind might be attempted."⁴

The plainest avowal of the new policy on the part of the unions appeared in the *London Times* during this same year.⁵ All unions which had participated in the Dock strike were to be united into a grand federation for mutual defence. Even colliers were to be included, "for they supply steamers with fuel" and their assistance "in cutting off the fuel supplies would be of the greatest value." Gas stokers too were needed for "a cessation of coal production in the interests of the men engaged in shipping would involve a cessation also in the manufacture of gas." The culmination of the

¹ *Report on Trades Societies*, National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, 1860, pages 151, 152.

² *Strikes and Lockouts in 1889*, p. 30. (Parl. Papers, 1890, v. lxviii.)

³ R. A. Woods, *English Social Movements*, pages 1-24.

⁴ October 25, 1890.

⁵ October 20, 1890.

movement was to be, this declaration asserted, "a federation of labor throughout the universe."

The statistics of such strikes in England, however, indicate their short-lived career. The following table is compiled from successive reports of the Labour Correspondent of the Board of Trade upon the subject:

Year	All Strikes	Sympathetic Strikes
1888	509	
1889	1,145	20
1890	1,028	19
1891	893	7
1892	692	2
1893	768	10
1894	101	15
1895	876	7

The Labour Correspondent remarked in 1890 that strikes of this sort were "usually unsuccessful."¹ In fact, of the eighty sympathetic strikes given in the above table, but fourteen succeeded.

In France the movement has been even less important. Sympathetic strikes make their first appearance in the *Statistique des Grèves*, published by the *Office du Travail*, in 1893. During that year eleven strikes were recorded as being caused "*par solidarité, sans demande spéciale*." These involved 150 establishments and 1622 men.² During the next year, however, but one such strike is recorded, and in the succeeding years none.³ Several instances of sympathetic strikes in Belgium are on record, but their importance

¹ *Strikes and Lockouts in 1890*, p. 16. (Parl. Papers, 1890-1891, v. lxxviii.)

² p. 154.

³ In 1897, however, another sympathetic strike of considerable magnitude was declared in Paris. Two thousand carpenters, drivers and other building trade workers struck for the benefit of the masons. *Bulletin de L'Office du Travail*, July, 1897, p. 444.

is slight.¹ No German statistics are available, but the same conditions would doubtless be found to exist there also.

Australia demands more attention. A better soil for the sympathetic movement could hardly be imagined. The general intelligence of the people, their acquaintance with the weapons of industrial warfare used in older countries, have made them quick to demand what they consider their rights, while the easy profits of a new country have made employers more ready because better able to accede to the demands made upon them.² Hence the almost hot-house growth of unionism on that continent. Nowhere is the federation of unions more complete.³ Nowhere has socialism taken deeper root. Its literature is widely read, especially by the men in the back country.⁴ A manifesto issued during the great strike of 1890, declared that the object of the strike was the "reconstruction of society."⁵ The lack of any systematic investigation of strikes previous to 1890, makes it impossible at this distance to trace the sympathetic movement on that continent to its beginnings.⁶ That sympathetic strikes existed before the strike of 1890, is evidenced by the size of that strike—for experimenting is not normally done on so grand a scale—and by the fact that several unions had already introduced into their rules provisions for the ordering of such strikes.⁷ The great struggle

¹ During the month of May, 1897, 490 "carriers" struck *par solidarité* with other "carriers" in Basècles. *Revue du Travail*, Deuxième Année, no. 6, p. 507.

² *Special United States Consular Reports upon Labor in Foreign Countries*, 1884, v. iii, pages 367 and 368.

³ The official source of information in regard to Australia has been the report referred to on page 9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Evidence*, Q. 1811. ⁵ *Ibid.*, *Evidence*, Q. 1805.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Report*, Paragraph v.

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Literary Appendix*, pages 143 and 152. Among the rules of the Amalgamated Slaughtermen and Journeymen Butchers' Union appears the following:

of 1890 has been mentioned above, and will be described in another connection. Its disastrous failure seems to have given the policy its death blow. A stubbornly contested strike among the shearers of Queensland and New South Wales took place the following year, but it received only financial assistance from outside the Shearers' Union.¹ In 1892, the miners who two years before had left their work in order to aid the men on the water front, were involved in a strike of their own, but the favor was not returned.² The movement in Australia seems, therefore, to have been of immense importance in the early years of this decade, but to have declined rapidly since that time.

The necessity which accounts for the existence of sympathetic lockouts is similar to that which caused the development of the sympathetic strike. The object of the latter was, it will be remembered, to enforce the maximum of injury upon the offending employer—the complete cessation of his establishment. To this end the workmen aim, first, to prevent his getting other workmen by a system of pickets, and, second, to prevent his using them, if gotten, by a system of sympathetic strikes. The position of the employer during all this time is analogous. His problem in order to force his settlement of the dispute, is to discover the maximum of injury which can be inflicted upon his employees legally, and to enforce that injury in every possible way.

In this case the maximum of injury proves to be threefold. His offending employees must be deprived of work at

"In case of dispute in any butcher shop, members in abattoirs shall refuse to kill, dress and deliver meat, and in case of a dispute in an abattoir, members in the butcher shops shall refuse to receive and cut such meat."

¹ *Royal Commission on Labor, Report on Australia*, p. 29. Parl. Papers, 1892, v. xxxvi, part v.

² *Ibid.*, p. 30.

his establishment; they must be kept out of employment in other establishments; and they must be cut off from the possibility of living without employment. The original cessation of work accomplishes the first of these ends. The strikers no longer look to their own employer as a means of support. In order that they may be equally unable to gain employment and support in the service of other masters, "black lists" of the men engaged in the strike are frequently sent to all employers who are likely to be approached by strikers, and the request is made that such men be refused employment.¹ In order to make it impossible for a given body of strikers to live without employment, the sympathetic lockout becomes a necessity. Unless contributions flowing from outside for the support of these strikers can be stopped in some way, their power of resistance is enormous. As Mallock has admirably pointed out, "the power of Labor" is really the power to *abstain* from labor.² The original cessation deprived the workmen of their customary labor. The sympathetic extension deprives them of the power to abstain from labor. It thus strikes at their very existence. It is a weapon of industrial warfare never found in the camp of Labor. No injury to an employer can touch his ability to abstain from labor. His capital is, as it were, a reservoir which his enemies are unable to reach, while his idle workmen depend upon a stream which can be annihilated at its very source. The whole purpose of militant unionism is, therefore, to destroy this inequality. A reservoir or strike fund takes the place of a stream of subscriptions. The average unionist, however, objects to such funds as being a temptation to useless striking. Even where they exist, they are not large and the assessment system must be resorted to if a protracted strike is to be maintained.

¹ *The Co-operative Wholesale Societies' Annual*, 1889, p. 298.

² *Labor and the Popular Welfare*, p. 309.

The necessity for sympathetic lockouts proves thus to be as old as the habit of contributions—a habit which has been shown to be as old as unionism. The sympathetic lockout was, therefore, a much earlier development than the sympathetic strike. It was the talk of the day in England in 1860, while the sympathetic strike was still a new device ten years ago. This fact is interesting in view of the denunciation which such strikes have often received at the hands of those who favor the employing classes. If the sympathetic lockout is really the model, and the sympathetic strike but a later and much later imitation, these denunciations lose much of their force. The sympathetic lockouts which came into prominence at the middle of the present century in England represent a rebellion on the part of the employers against a very systematic type of financial assistance which seems to have been common at that time among workmen involved in a strike. When all the men in a given locality had a common grievance against their employers, it had been found advisable to apply their remedy, the strike, to but “one employer at a time.” Those who struck were supported, sometimes for long periods, by the men in other establishments who remained at work, only to take their turn at striking when the first strikers had gained their point. Such a series of successful strikes at Dewsbury, England, lasted from 1821 to 1823.¹ This policy was naturally denounced by the employers, and very bitter things were said about those who “treacherously apply the wages they receive from our hands to feed the mutiny against us.”² The policy appeared in its most odious form in the strike in the London building trades in 1859. A general demand had been made upon all em-

¹ *Co-operative Wholesale Societies' Annual*, 1889, pages 266-311.

² From the “Statement” of an Employers' Association in 1852. *Report on Trades Societies*, National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, 1860, p. 198.

ployers for a nine-hour day and had been refused. A ballot was thereupon taken to see which of the employers should be "set down" as the first to be attacked.¹ In another case the unfortunate employer's name was taken "by chance out of a hat."²

The most natural means of defense against such a policy—a lockout of all who were thus contributing to the strikers—was at first regarded as too severe, and various other plans were tried. The most common of these was that adopted by certain mine owners in West Yorkshire in 1858. A wage reduction of 15 per cent., declared by all employers, had provoked the men into their usual form of resistance, a strike against certain selected employers. The Employers' Association thereupon resolved "that the masters whose men are at the 15 per cent. reduction shall pay to those masters whose men are on a strike the 15 per cent. taken from the men working." After six months the plan was abandoned for the sympathetic lockout.³

Although the sympathetic lockout first became common after 1851, instances are on record as far back as the close of the last century. In 1786 certain bookbinders employed in four London shops demanded shorter hours of work. Their employers refused and induced all employers in the city to discharge their men in sympathy.⁴ Mr. Webb refers to a similar lockout declared by the "master breeches makers at the end of the last century."⁵ In 1829 the fine spinners of Manchester struck against a reduction of wages

¹ *Report on Trades Societies*, National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, 1860, p. 60.

² *Ibid.*, p. 59.

³ *Transactions* of the same society, 1859, pages 641 and 642.

⁴ *Report on Trade Societies*, National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, 1860, pages 93-95.

⁵ Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *History of Trade Unionism*, p. 239.

and were supported for twenty three weeks "by their Union funds, contributed chiefly by the coarse spinners who were still employed and whom the change did not affect." At the end of that time the employers demanded that such contributions should cease, and discharged the coarse spinners when they refused.¹ In 1836 the file makers of Sheffield proposed a new scale for all their employees and resolved that "if the workmen of *any* of their number refuse to work at the scale proposed, they would close all their manufactories" ² In 1851 an Employers' Association in the engineering trades of Lancashire put forth the following public notice:

"A body of persons styling themselves the Amalgamated Society of engineers, etc., having made demands on several firms in this district which are totally inconsistent with the rights of employees, and the same body having further given notice to one of the principal firms that unless their demand be at once conceded they will go out on a strike. . . We, the undersigned engineers, etc., employers in the aggregate of ten thousand hands, have unanimously determined to close our establishments in case any turn out of such people or of the work-people in the employ of *any* of us should take place." ³

The multiplication of sympathetic lockouts during the next fifteen years makes it impossible more than to mention the more important. Eighteen thousand mill hands in Preston were turned out of employment in 1853 because of disagreements which affected the men in but four or five firms.⁴ Twenty-four hundred coal miners in West Yorkshire were locked out in 1858 for contributing to 800 of their fellows.⁵

¹ *Report on Trade Societies*, National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, 1860, p. 394.

² *Ibid.*, p. 548.

³ *Ibid.*, pages 177 and 178.

⁴ *Journal of the Statistical Society of London*, v. 30, p. 12.

⁵ *Transactions of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science*, 1859, p. 642.

The doors of seventeen flint glass factories were closed in 1859 upon some 500 operatives because of grievances which affected but two factories.¹ During the same year 24,000 of the 40,000 men employed in the London building trades were locked out by the Associated Employers as soon as a strike had been begun against one of their number.² Lock-outs of this type had become so common in 1861 that Mr. J. M. Ludlow, writing in that year remarked: "Seldom can the workmen of a single employer engage in a contest with him one day without having to face the chance of seeing the whole employer class (in their department) of the town or district arrayed against them on the morrow."³ Industrial war on such a scale naturally attracted great attention. The National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, appointed a committee which spent two years in an elaborate investigation of the subject. The Society of Arts called a joint conference of unionists and employers in 1854 to discuss among other questions, the following: "Should partial strikes intended to take the masters of a locality in detail be met by lockouts?"⁴ At a conference held in Sheffield in 1866 representatives of 200,000 trade unionists formed "The United Kingdom Alliance of Organized Trades," for the purpose of supporting "the members of any trade who should find themselves locked out by their employers."⁵ The speedy disruption of this organization because of its inability to distinguish lockouts from strikes was alluded to in the preceding chapter.⁶

The most significant feature in regard to the lockout

¹ *Report on Trades Societies*, National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, 1860, p. 109.

² *Ibid.*, pages 60 and 66.

³ *Macmillan's Magazine*, v. iii, p. 321.

⁴ *Journal of the Society of Arts*, v. 2, p. 206.

⁵ Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *History of Trades Unionism*, p. 241.

⁶ Above, p. 18.

movement at this time is the position assumed by the champions of unionism. At least three cases are on record¹ where such action on the part of employers is condemned by union sympathizers as being a method of warfare without counterpart on the side of labor. In each instance the writers proceed to explain what action would be analagous to the sympathetic lockout, or lockout as it was always called. The form of strike they describe in these explanations is, they insist, something purely imaginary, something workmen never had or never would be willing to countenance, something, in fact as totally unjustifiable as the lockout of which it was the logical analogy. Their descriptions were imaginary, no doubt, but they were prophetic too, for they were descriptions of the sympathetic strike. One of these fortuitous prophecies—that of Mr. Frederick Harrison—is so remarkable as to warrant reproduction here. It appeared in the *Fortnightly Review* in 1865.

“The moment we draw the true parallel on the side of the men to the lockout on the part of the masters, we see the truth of this position in a striking light. The true parallel to the lockout would be this. Let us suppose that a committee of the Union of Iron workers gave a fortnight's notice to every employer that they required a 10 per cent. rise in their wages; that every firm reluctantly agreed to it except the iron-masters of North Staffordshire, who with promises of assistance from the other capitalists, refused. We have next to suppose that the committee of the men's union gave orders to every iron-worker in the kingdom suddenly to cease to work, whether employed by a master who had assisted the North Staffordshire masters or not. *Suppose the orders of the committee were that no man should work for any employer for any wages under any conditions or in consideration of any promise until the North Staffordshire masters had agreed to the terms of the union.* This is the true

¹ Wm. Newton in 1854 (*Journal of the Society of Arts*, v. 2, p. 206), J. M. Ludlow in 1865 (*Good Words*, v. 6, p. 374) and Frederick Harrison in 1865 (*Fortnightly Review*, v. 1, p. 108).

parallel of the lockout, and it can be safely said that no body of workmen in the kingdom ever ventured upon or thought of so wanton an exercise of power. The public feeling would at once stigmatize such an act as systematic oppression and terrorism."

Twenty-four years later Mr. Harrison had occasion to write an article upon the New Unionism of 1889. Speaking of the great sympathetic strike which had just occurred at the London docks, he said:

"There has been, then, a sympathetic combination of workmen, more rapid and more electric than anything seen before. We have witnessed the 'solidarity of labor,' or the 'fraternity of workmen,' a perfectly real and powerful force, when it can be organized and brought into practical result. It simply means the common interest of all the toiling millions to help each other towards their social improvement."¹

But the world has moved in twenty-four years, and Mr. Harrison has changed no more, perhaps, than others.

From 1860 to the present the sympathetic lockout has been constantly employed as the strongest weapon which united employers can use. After the report just mentioned, only scattered accounts of lockouts appeared until the formation of the Labour Department of the Board of Trade in 1888. Sympathetic lockouts appear frequently in the reports of this department, and the resolutions adopted by employers' associations have the same ring as those quoted above.² In 1890 employers engaged in the shipbuilding and engineering trades of the United Kingdom became federated with the following among their objects: "To support any association or combination of firms in a district, or single firm in bringing any unreasonable strike to an end by not employing, or

¹ *The Nineteenth Century*, v. 26, p. 724.

² For such resolutions see *The Labor Gazette*, v. 3, p. 81, and *The Quarterly Review*, v. 146, p. 492.

by the adoption of any other means decided upon."¹ The application of this policy to the engineering dispute of 1897 will be referred to in a later connection.

Sympathetic lockouts are not as common in this country as in England. They seem to have developed simultaneously with sympathetic strikes, and do not, therefore, date much farther back than 1886. A lockout of this type took place among the lathers of Beverly, Massachusetts, in 1887. Men in two shops struck for the adoption of a desired price list, and the cause of the employers thus attacked was taken up by nearly all the employers in the town.² The settlement of a difficulty in an Amsterdam knitting mill during the same year was forced by a lockout on the part of fifty-eight leading firms.³ In 1890 the furniture workers of a certain shop in New York City declared a strike to force the discharge of an objectionable foreman. The Masters' Association thereupon discharged all members of the Furniture Workers' Union wherever employed.⁴ An employers' association of shoe manufacturers in Rochester used the same means during that year to force the settlement of a dispute which concerned but one member of the association.⁵ The so-called Leadville strike during the summer of 1896 was quite largely a sympathetic lockout. A uniform wage of three dollars a day had been decided upon by the Western Federation of Miners, and all the miners in Leadville who received less than that amount declared a strike. The mine owners at once made the cessation complete by closing all the mines.

¹ *The Nineteenth Century*, v. 27, p. 713.

² *Report of the Massachusetts Board of Arbitration and Conciliation*, 1888, p. 51.

³ *Report of the New York Bureau of Labor Statistics*, 1887, p. 317.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1890, part iii, p. 1043.

⁵ *Report of the New York Bureau of Labor Statistics*, 1891, part iii, p. 583.

Over 1,300 men were thrown out of employment for more than four months.¹

Sympathetic lockouts are not common on the continent of Europe, for organization among laborers has not called for the counter organization of employers which has been attained in this country and in England. Such lockouts have occurred, however. Fifteen hundred metal workers in Ghent, Belgium, were locked out because three hundred and fifty of their number had declared a strike.² Seventy-eight firms in a German city closed their establishments in 1890 because one of their number was being boycotted by all the men.³

The sympathetic lockout proves thus to be as generally used as the sympathetic strike. It developed much earlier than the sympathetic strike, because the necessity which called it into existence was itself an early development, and because the higher intellectual position of employers made them more willing to "discount a present injury in order to gain a future good." They could understand it fifty years ago. Their employees could not.

¹ *Report of the Colorado Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1895-1896*, p. 61.

² *The Labor Gazette*, v. iii, p. 311.

³ *Strikes and Lockouts in 1890*, p. 25. (Parl. Papers, 1890-1891, v. lxxviii.)

CHAPTER III

ANALYSIS OF SYMPATHETIC STRIKES AND SYMPATHETIC LOCKOUTS

AT once the most difficult, as well as the most interesting, part of the subject has now been reached—the economic power which lies at the basis of the movement. Sympathetic strikes are undertaken, as the New York Reports term it, “to assist” other strikers. Having said this, writers almost never go further and explain exactly how the strike of one set of men assists the strikers elsewhere. Even labor leaders seem often to order or advise such strikes without being sure they will not injure the local cause more than they help it. This uncertainty arises from the complex nature of the pressure which sympathetic strikes often exert. The question is very much simplified, however, if such strikes are first classified according to the relation which the offending employer bears to the employer whose men declare the sympathetic strike. The classification is here presented in outline, and will be explained at length in the pages which follow.

CLASSIFICATION OF SYMPATHETIC STRIKES

- Class I. Where the sympathetic strikers are in the service of the offending employer.
- Class II. Where the sympathetic strikers are in the service of employers who do business with the offender.
 - 1. Sell goods or services to him.
 - 2. Buy goods or services from him.
- Class III. Where the sympathetic strikers are in the service of employers who compete with the offender.

Class IV. Where the sympathetic strikers are in the service of employers who co-operate with the offender.

Class V. Where the sympathetic strikers are in the service of employers who have no relation to the offender.

Sympathetic strikes of the first class—where the offending employer is identical with the employer affected by the sympathetic strike—are probably more common than all others, though they are rarely described or recorded statistically. One hundred shoe-stitchers struck in a Massachusetts factory in 1887, against a reduction of wages which affected but seven of their number.¹ From the individual standpoint, therefore, the strike was almost entirely sympathetic. There is at present no means by which the amount of such sympathetic striking can be measured, although this amount is considerable. Especially is this so in the case of strikes which involve large establishments or factories. In the printing trade, strikes of this sort are frequent. The proprietor of a printing establishment has come to expect a strike of lithographers and pressmen if the demands of the compositors are not admitted, and *vice-versâ*. Sympathetic strikes of this class may involve but one factory or plant. Within this, the number of employees who actually have a grievance is often ridiculously small. Five hundred English miners recently declared a strike because the checkweighman lacked a suitable shelter. After two days, according to the account, the employer gave in and the checkweighman was provided with a "box."² Sympathetic strikes may also involve a large number of factories or plants, sometimes in widely-separated localities, and yet belong to this first class, because these enterprises are owned by a single employer—one immense corporation it may be. The

¹ *Tenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor*, v. i, p. 378.

² *Strikes and Lockouts in 1891*, p. 165. (Parl. Papers, 1893-1894, v. lxxxiii, Part i.)

very nature of the transportation business allows such strikes to extend for hundreds of miles and yet involve but one employer. Strikes of this sort are often logically extended to other companies known to include some of the same stockholders who are found in the company originally affected. During 1888 the locomotive engineers were involved in the most serious strike of their history. The trouble arose upon the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad. In course of the strike, the engineers on the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe declared a sympathetic strike in the belief that many men held stock in both roads.¹

The economic purpose of strikes of this simplest class is easily understood. Had picketing succeeded and no non-union men been secured, the maximum of injury, explained in the preceding chapter, would have been inflicted upon the employer by the strike of the original disputants. Each part in the productive process is essential, and the refusal of one set of workers to perform their part, and the employer's inability to obtain others in their place, brings the entire process to a standstill. When picketing fails, however, the maximum of injury is enforceable only by a strike of the other hands.² The mere increase in the number of places to be filled increases the probability that the establishment must be closed, but that probability is still further increased if the sympathetic strikers are more skilled than those who originally left their work. The strike at the London Dock in 1889 achieved its remarkable success for this very reason. The work of a "docker" is confined to the unloading of vessels and is as nearly unskilled as can well be imagined.

¹ Salmons, *The Burlington Strike*, pages 333 and 334.

² The statement that each part of the productive process is essential, and that its stoppage stops the whole is true in general, although exceptions may be easily instanced. In so far as such is the case, sympathetic strikes are necessary to enforce the closing of the establishment, even though picketing does not fail.

In spite of the undoubted justice of the strikers' demands, their effort, would certainly have failed, had it received no sympathetic assistance from without. "Three men walked the streets outside the dock-yard gates for every one employed within."¹ It was the strike of the stevedores, the loaders of vessels, a skilled and organized trade, which substituted victory for defeat.² Sympathetic strikes of this type have been naturally an early development of the sympathetic idea. If the unaffected workmen are willing that the original strikers shall succeed, and if that original strike can only succeed by the closing of the establishment (actually or in the anticipation of the employer), it follows, that these unaffected workmen are willing to sacrifice their employment in order to assist their fellows. Under such circumstances, it is a matter of little importance whether they declare a sympathetic strike or not. The result, so far as they are concerned, is the same. If they do not strike, the establishment closes because of their employer's inability to fill the places of the original strikers. They thus lose their employment, and to declare a sympathetic strike would cost them no more. This low "cost of production" accounts, therefore, for the early development and frequent use of sympathetic strikes of this first and simplest class.

Sympathetic strikes of the second class are declared by men in the service of employers who have direct business relations with the employer originally involved. This is perhaps the most important class of all. At any rate, it is sympathetic strikes of this sort which attract the most attention, because of the great dimensions they often assume. Their power arises from the interdependence of employers

¹ *The Universal Review*, v. 5, p. 161.

² Smith and Nash, *The Dockers' Strike*, chaps. i and ii.

who are thus associated. Every establishment touches those associated with it on two opposite sides. It buys goods or services from some, and sells goods or services to others. Each process is essential to the life of the concern, and if a sympathetic strike can stop either, its power is great.

A strike in the building trades may be extended sympathetically to the brick-yards. The employer's supply of raw material is thus cut off—for the time being, at least. The second employer has probably been asked to refuse to furnish bricks to the offender, and his refusal thus to boycott the master-builder precipitates the strike of his own men. Again, the services of other employers, especially of transportation companies, are about as essential to a given employer as are the goods which other employers produce. To prevent the purchase of services by an offending employer, sympathetic strikes may be declared against all who furnish them. Such a strike occurred on the Reading railroad in 1887. Coal from Pennsylvania, where the miners were on a strike, was being carried to the coast by the Reading. The employees of the railroad struck in large numbers, and thus made it impossible for the Reading to continue to render this service to the owners of the mines.¹ The Pullman Company has for years purchased services from the railroads of the United States in the shape of motive power. The strike inaugurated by the American Railway Union in 1894 aimed to make such purchases impossible, and for a time succeeded.

Sympathetic strikes may also be applied at the other end of an employer's business operations. They may be used to deprive the offending employer of his selling market. Men employed by his customers refuse to work any longer. In 1892 all the granite-workers and stone-cutters in sixteen establishments in Brooklyn refused to touch stone received

¹ *Labor Troubles in the Anthracite Region of Pennsylvania*, House Report, no. 4147, 50th Cong., 2d Session.

from certain quarries in New England, where a general strike was pending, and struck to enforce their refusal. The offending quarry owners in New England were thus unable to sell their material to any of these establishments, because the latter were unable to work it up.¹ While the ship-owners of Australia were involved in the great strike of 1890, they attempted, by means of non-union men, to carry coal from the northern part of the island to the southern. They were, in fact, selling their services as carriers to the mine-owners. Thereupon the miners struck, the mines were closed and such sales became impossible.

Sympathetic strikes of the second class thus involve employers who buy or sell to each other. Either employer may be the original offender, and the men in the service of the other come out in sympathy, but the pressure in the two cases is far from being the same. If an employer, whose men have struck, is merely prevented from buying of another employer because the latter's men have declared a sympathetic strike, he can usually find some other employer who is able to serve him equally well; but if he loses a customer because of a strike in the latter's establishment, the loss is complete and without means of redress. Sympathetic strikes of the former type are, therefore, comparatively few. During the period of the last United States Report upon the subject, strikes occurred in but two establishments "against firm supplying goods to a boycotted establishment,"² while 59 establishments were involved in strikes "against the use of boycotted material."³ A curiously complicated strike occurred in 1887 in connection with the longshoremen's strike at Elizabethport. It illustrates at once the two forms

¹ *Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of New York*, 1892, Part ii, p. 237.

² *Tenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor*, v. ii, p. 1859.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 1861.

of pressure just described. The coal company whose coal handlers were on a strike, was able to get more or less of its coal emptied from the cars by means of non-union labor. Some of this coal was sold for fuel to a mill in the vicinity, whereupon the workmen employed in that establishment declared a sympathetic strike. The mill continued to run, however, by means of non-union labor, and a sympathetic strike of the second degree was declared. Eighty-five coopers struck in an establishment which was accustomed to furnish the mill with barrels.¹ In the first instance, when the mill hands struck against the use of the so-called "scab coal," the possible pressure upon the original offender, the coal company, was considerable. Had the sympathetic strike succeeded in closing the mill, the coal company would have been deprived of a customer, a purchaser of its coal. In the second sympathetic extension, when the coopers struck in order to bring the offending milling company to terms, this latter company was merely forced to buy its barrels elsewhere, not at all a difficult matter, although undoubtedly involving some delay.

This difference of economic pressure finds an interesting confirmation in the treatment which employers accord to requests which they receive from unions to boycott the employer whose men have struck. It is plain that a cessation of business relations between the employer who is asked to do the boycotting and the offending employer affects each in an exactly opposite way. If the former—the outside employer—is asked by the union to stop buying of the latter, it is an easy matter for him to accede without loss while the loss of the offending employer is the loss of a customer, and

¹ *Tenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor*, v. i, p. 638. In this instance, as in several others, the information printed in the report has been supplemented by details taken from the original returns preserved by the Department at Washington.

is severe. On the other hand, if an outside employer is asked to stop selling to another he can accede only at a loss, while the loss of the offending employer is slight. He is merely forced to buy elsewhere. As a result of this, it is not at all unnatural that requests for boycotts take the former or stronger form. Such a boycott causes the smallest injury to the employer who declares it, while, at the same time, it inflicts the severest injury upon the employer who is the original offender. Requests for boycotts of this sort are often acceded to by employers; while boycotts of the latter type, inflicting, as they do, more injury on the one who boycotts than on the offender, are seldom requested by the men, and almost never acceded to by the employers.

The history of railroad boycotts may seem to contradict this last statement. Cases are common where one road is boycotted by another at the request of the union behind the movement. The former road refuses to haul cars received from the latter—refuses, in fact to sell its services as usual in the shape of car transportation, and thereby loses a customer for those services. It has just been shown that boycotts of this type are essentially weak. There is a double reason, however, why they have a real strength in the railroad business. When boycotts of this class were described as weak, it was assumed that the offending employer could turn readily to some other employer for the materials or services which he was accustomed to receive from the employer who now declares the boycott. This assumption is manifestly false in the case of artificial or natural monopolies. In proportion, therefore, as a given railroad possesses this character, a boycott which it may declare against another road receives strength. The other reason which makes the railroad business exceptional in regard to boycotts is inherent in its very nature. In other industries it is unusual to find two given employers who are

both buyers of and sellers to each other to any considerable extent. This is the ordinary case in railroading, however. Two adjoining roads are continually selling services to each other in the shape of transportation, allowing the values of such services to offset each other in much the same manner as in international payments. When a road, therefore, is asked to boycott another, it never stands to this latter in the shape of a seller of services alone. It hauls the cars of the offending road, it is true, but that road also hauls its cars. It appears, therefore, that the very nature of the industry precludes the use of the classification which applies to other industries. A boycott declared by one railroad against its neighbor, has a double effect. It deprives the offender of an opportunity to purchase services from this source, while, at the same time it makes it impossible for him to sell his own services there. Whether the boycott is weak or strong will, therefore, depend upon the relative amount of services which are thus mutually exchanged, how much mileage of transportation the offender does for its neighbor, as compared with the amount done by this latter for the offender.

The basis of the power possessed by sympathetic strikes of the class just described is thus seen to rest upon the interdependence of modern employers, an inter-dependence which is, however, only a development of that which exists inside a large factory, and which there forms the economic basis of those sympathetic strikes described under Class I. The economic power of a strike of miners which deprives an offending employer of his supply of fuel proves thus to be identical with the economic power which the sympathetic strike of the spinners in a factory exerts upon an offending employer who is involved in a dispute with his weavers. Division of occupations gives one its power, and division of labor the other.

The third general class of sympathetic strikes outlined on page 52 includes those strikes which involve competitors. The power is here by no means so apparent as is the case with the two classes already described. When both the original strikers and the sympathetic strikers are in the service of the same employer, the power of the sympathetic strike is plain. So too when the outside employer has business relations with the offender, the power of the sympathetic strike is appreciable, though the case is more complicated. When, however, sympathetic strikes are declared against an employer by men in the service of his competitors, the pressure which is brought to bear upon the offender is not easy, at first glance, to explain. How can an injury to a competitor make a given employer any more willing to yield to his own striking workmen? His business is injured severely by the strike of his own men, and it would seem natural for him to welcome an injury to competitors who are profiting by his misfortune, especially when such an injury takes the form of a sympathetic strike among the men employed by such competitors. Such strikes are common, however, which is proof enough that they are supposed at least to exert a pressure of the desired sort. This assumed pressure is usually little more than a moral one however. The offending employer is made to realize that he is the cause of extensive injury to his fellow employers, and that if he does not relieve them by yielding to his own men, he must expect the same treatment from them when the tables are turned.¹ The mere display of sympathy shown by such a strike is also supposed to have an influence upon the offender. One of the largest strikes which England has ever seen—the coal strike in 1893—was extended sympathetically

¹ An employer who has been involved in several extensive strikes of this sort, remarked to the author that, in his opinion, this moral pressure was tremendous—that few employers dared to stand out against it.

beyond its normal size for this avowed purpose. The objections to such an extension, as being a source of weakness to the movement, were detailed at the meeting of delegates, but they carried little weight against the desire to "present an absolutely unbroken front."¹

Sympathetic strikes among men employed by competitors are not, however, entirely lacking in economic power. With the increasing strength of trade unions, competing employers have found it to their advantage to co-operate with each other in times of strikes. Various forms of assistance are rendered to an employer involved in a strike to enable him to fulfil contracts which he may have on hand. When this is done, or when the men even suspect that it is being done, sympathetic strikes are declared against all employers who render such assistance. In 1891 all the coal mining companies in a large district in Colorado were involved in a strike, because the men suspected that these companies were "supplying the United Coal Company with coal, and otherwise lending it secret aid and encouragement."² In the iron moulding industry this inter-competitor assistance takes a different form. In 1887 a St. Louis iron company, whose men were on a strike, sent its patterns to similar firms all over the country. Sympathetic strikes took place wherever the attempt was made to use such patterns and thus enable the St. Louis company to fill its orders.³ When sympathetic strikes are employed in the coal mining industry they are usually of this inter-competitor type. The most conspicuous instance occurred in 1894, when the miners in Pennsylvania and Illinois, over 75,000 strong, struck for an advance of wages, and 28,000 other miners in Colorado,

¹ *Strikes and Lockouts in 1893*, p. 16. (Parl. Papers, 1894, v. lxxxi, Part i.)

² *Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of Colorado, 1895-1896*, pages 13 and 14.

³ *Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of New York, 1887*, p. 296.

Iowa, Missouri, Tennessee and West Virginia left work in sympathy.¹

Sympathetic strikes are more frequent in the building trades—especially the building trades of New York State—than in any other industry. Such sympathetic strikes constitute a class by themselves. (Class IV.) The men who strike in sympathy are not in the service of the employer with whom the original dispute exists, nor are they in the service of another employer with whom he has business connections or with whom he competes. The employers usually affected by sympathetic strikes in the building trades are those who must co-operate continuously with the offending employer. A regulation of the Building Department in New York City requires that the iron frame of a building shall not stand, at any time, more than two floors higher than the walls.* The employer holding the contract for masonry, therefore, must co-operate with the iron-frame contractor. In other cases no public regulation is necessary. Plumbers and carpenters must co-operate of necessity. This necessity makes the use of sympathetic strikes in such cases very effective. Hardly any form of economic pressure could be more complete.

Strikes of this sort are very common. In fact it is the exception in these trades when a strike is limited to the men originally involved. In making their contracts unionists insist upon retaining their right to declare a sympathetic strike whenever it becomes necessary. The following, quoted by Levasseur, is a fair sample of the tone of such contracts :

“ It is understood and agreed by both parties that the members of the Laborers’ and Hod-carriers’ Union shall be governed in the

¹ *Tenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor*, v. i, pages 1127, 87, 251, 299, 551, 1171, 1215.

² *New York Evening Post*, Dec. 22, 1897.

matter of sympathetic strikes, if these occur, by the decision of the president and representative of the Building Trades' Council, acting in accordance with a majority of the delegates of the federation."¹

One hundred and twenty-three sympathetic strikes occurred in the building trades in New York State during the year 1890.² Two employers on the average were involved in such strikes, although in a majority of cases (87 out of 123) but one employer was affected by the sympathetic extension. These 123 strikes constituted nearly 80 per cent. of all the sympathetic strikes which occurred in New York State during that year, and the year was a typical one. The decided economic pressure of such strikes is reflected in the high percentage of success which is attained. Out of the 123, all but 17 succeeded. This proportion of success, 87 per cent., compares favorably with 83 per cent., the average success of all the building trade strikes during that year in New York State.³

Sympathetic strikes have occasionally been extended to men in the service of employers who have no apparent connection with the employer originally involved.⁴ (Class V.).

¹ *L'Ouvrier Américain*, v. 1, p. 510.

² The summaries of the seven and one-half years covered by the last report upon strikes, do not give the information needed in regard to sympathetic strikes. It has been necessary, therefore, to confine the statistical study to a typical year.

³ *Tenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor*, v. 1, pages 730-757.

⁴ The sympathetic strikes of this class which occurred in New York State during the years 1886-1889, were as follows:

Longshoremen to assist bag sewers.

Locksmiths to assist coopers.

Ship carpenters to assist longshoremen.

Butchers to assist coal handlers.

Waiters to assist car employees.

Wool pullers to assist sheep butchers.

Bakers to assist painters.

Car employees to assist dry dock employees.

A sympathetic strike in New Orleans, in 1892, involved "nearly all the indus-

This is the most extreme development of the sympathetic idea. It is sympathetic strikes of this type which are most bitterly denounced by the employers. A New York builder remarked in 1890 in regard to the action of his men in declaring such a strike, that "he did not object to their assisting the building trades strikes, but he objected to their going out to assist factory strikers."¹

The economic pressure of such strikes is, of course, a negative quantity. Even the moral pressure which they exert is slight. The "display of sympathy" which they cause is intended to affect the offending employer directly, but it aims also to attract the attention of the public to the original strike and eventually gain its support for the movement. The purpose of the longshoremen's strike in 1888, according to the Assembly committee which investigated the subject was "to enlighten the public as to the wrongs of the strikers and bring the pressure of public opinion to bear on the employers."² Such strikes are supposed to express "the inarticulate protest of the masses against the wrongs inflicted upon any of their brothers, and their yearning for justice to all mankind."³ The influence of public opinion in the prosecution of strikes of any considerable size is undeniable. Such a strike almost forces the public to take sides on the merits or justice of the case. The injury which it receives from a strike such as that of the English engineers in 1897, is tremendous. During the coal-handlers strike in 1887, the price of coal rose to twelve dollars a ton and it could often

tries" of the city, throwing 27,000 persons out of employment, although the original dispute concerned but 600 draymen. (*Tenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor*, 1894, v. 1, pages 326-329. See also the *Yale Review*, v. ii, p. 8.)

¹ *Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of New York*, 1890, Part ii, p. 995.

² Quoted in the *Nation*, v. 44, p. 112.

³ *North American Review*, v. 159, p. 204.

not be obtained for that.¹ One at least of the great sugar houses was compelled to suspend operations for lack of fuel thus causing a considerable rise in the retail price of sugar. The well-known result of a large strike in causing the migration of trade to other districts or even countries is well illustrated in the case of the recent engineering dispute in England. It is reported that one of the engineering firms in Leeds proposes to erect works in Germany, and to transfer three-fourths of their business there. The remaining fourth will go to Russia.² According to a recent decision of the courts, the city of Chicago is liable for three-fourths of all the damages sustained by property owners at the hands of the mobs during the strike of 1894.³

It is evidently the theory of most unionists that the public, when injured in this way, will take sides with the strikers provided they refrain from violence, and there certainly seems to be ground for such a belief. During the Chicago strike of 1894, quantities of fruit in California rotted on the ground or in the cars for lack of transportation, yet public sentiment remained to the end in favor of the strikers. Scarcely a paper took sides against them.⁴ But there is a limit to the extent of the public patience, and it is realized by most leaders of labor. The gas stokers at Melbourne were anxious to strike in sympathy with the seamen in 1891, and thus leave the city in darkness. A labor leader testified before the Commission that he was obliged "to attend six or seven meetings in order to persuade these men not to strike and thus *break faith with the public*."⁵ Ac-

¹ *Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of New York*, 1887, p. 332.

² *New York Mail and Express*, Aug. 26, 1897.

³ *New York Evening Post*, June 22, 1897.

⁴ *Yale Review*, v, iii, p. 244, also *Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of California*, 1895-1896, p. 149.

⁵ New South Wales, *Report of the Royal Commission on Strikes*, 1891, *Evidence*, Q. 3812.

according to their own statement, the leaders of the Reading strike in 1887, were kept from extending their strike to the passenger service only by their fear that the injury to the public would be so great that sympathy would be alienated.¹ Strikes of this extreme sort are fortunately not common. Their slight and very uncertain power gives all the assurance which is needed that they will not become more common than they are at present.

The foregoing pages have indicated the various forms of pressure which a sympathetic strike is supposed to exert upon an offending employer. The reverse side—the pressure which this same strike exerts upon the original strikers, the men in whose interest it is declared—this pressure, counteracting the effect of the other, is one of the most important elements to be considered. The one represents the economic power of the sympathetic strike to the original striker, while the other indicates its economic weakness.

A sympathetic strike may cause financial loss to the men who inaugurate the original strike in four distinct ways. It may, first of all, deprive them of a source of income which had been received before the sympathetic strike was declared, or would have been received, had it never been declared. “Financial sympathy” and “striking sympathy” are mutually exclusive terms. Again, a sympathetic strike in some cases renders the original strikers responsible for the support of those who strike for their assistance. By an agreement, mentioned below, between the unions engaged in printing, that union for whose sake the sympathetic strike is declared must supply the strike wage, five to seven dollars per week, to the members of the other unions who strike in

¹ *Labor Troubles in Pennsylvania*, p. 287. (House Report, No. 4147, 50th Cong., 2d Ses.)

sympathy.¹ In the third place, as a strike is extended, there is a more than proportionate increase in the number of compulsory strikers. These men are often unskilled and unorganized. They have no funds for their support, and unless the union in charge of the original strike and its sympathetic ramifications contributes to their support, they soon become hostile to the movement, an attitude which is disastrous, in view of their power to bring it into disrepute by acts of violence. Realizing the importance of this, unions often voluntarily give financial assistance to men who are thus forced out of work by the strike.² Finally, it may be assumed that sympathetic strikes appeal less to the sympathies of the public than grievance strikes, because of their supposed injustice. All sympathetic extensions, therefore, tend to decrease the outside financial support which the original strike may have possessed.

In view of the absolutely certain losses which are thus caused by a sympathetic extension, the assistance which such an extension renders to the original strikers needs to be equally certain. As a matter of fact, this assistance is frequently of the haziest sort. When an attempt is made, for example, to injure an offending company by a sympathetic strike in another on the ground that this latter company contains many of the same stockholders as the former, the injury is very real if that condition actually exists. Workmen, however, rarely have any means of knowing whether it does exist or not. They are obliged to act on suspicion only.³ Again, when sympathetic strikes are used to prevent employers filling orders for each other, this step too has often to be taken on a mere suspicion that such

¹ See page 101.

² *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, v. i, p. 202.

³ *Labor Troubles in Pennsylvania*, p. cviii. (House Report No. 4147, 50th Cong., 2d Ses.)

assistance is being rendered. The coal miners referred to on page 62, struck because, as they put it, they "suspected" that the other companies were supplying the offending company with coal "and otherwise giving it secret aid." Sympathetic strikes on an international scale were decided upon in 1891 by the International Congress of Miners, but never took place because of this very difficulty. The movement was intended to assist the miners of Belgium, and the miners in other countries were to strike whenever their employers should ship coal to Belgium and thus relieve the scarcity caused there by the strike. Large quantities of coal were undoubtedly shipped in this way from England, but, as Mr. Burnett remarks, "it is impossible for miners engaged in hewing coal to know the place to which it is to be or may be sent."¹ The sympathetic strikes were possible only on paper.

In some instances unions are obliged to suspect this rendering of assistance in the face of assurances from the company in question that no such assistance will be, or is being rendered. The Reading Strike of 1887 was declared on the basis of such suspicions. The railroad had agreed with the union not to assist the coal company, where a strike was in progress, by carrying its coal. The suspicions of the men became aroused, however, by certain unusual movements of the cars until "the inference was irresistible that the Reading Company was secretly aiding the Lehigh operators by supplying them with coal with which to fill their orders."² These cases illustrate how difficult it may often become to ascertain whether employers are thus rendering mutual assistance or are doing business

¹ *Strikes and Lockouts in 1890*, pages 33 and 34. (Parl. Papers, 1890-1891, v. lxxviii.)

² *Labor Troubles in Pennsylvania, 1887-88*, p. ciii. (House Reports, no. 4147, 50th Cong., 2d Sess.)

with each other, if they take any pains at all to conceal it. If, therefore, the employees declare a sympathetic strike in pursuit of a suspicion which really has no basis in fact, the financial injury their sympathetic strike causes to the original strikers is absolutely uncompensated by any pressure exerted upon the original and offending employer.

In some instances, a sympathetic strike, beside inflicting no injury upon the offending employer, may actually benefit him. Such an instance occurred in connection with the coal strike of 1894. A certain company in Ohio had accumulated a quantity of coal which it would have been obliged to sell at a loss had the price of coal remained at the point where it stood before the strike. This company, accordingly, took pains to provoke its men to a strike, assuming that it would be extended sympathetically. Exactly this took place. The price of coal rose and the company mentioned was able to dispose of its entire stock at immense profits.¹

The sympathetic strike proves, therefore, to be an edged tool in the hands of labor. Its power at times is great, but it cuts both ways, and requires no little intelligence for its effective use.

Sympathetic lockouts require no such elaborate classification as was used in the case of sympathetic strikes in order to show their economic power. As in the case of sympathetic strikes, it is possible here also to distinguish those sympathetic lockouts which involve only employers who are parties to the original dispute from those in which outside employers take part in the struggle. In 1890, 175 spinners struck in a factory in England. Subscriptions from the 3,000 other employees were being used for their support,

¹ *Report of the Missouri Bureau of Labor Statistics*, 1894, p. 523.

and a sympathetic lockout of the whole number was the result.¹ In factory towns the wives and children of strikers are often dismissed in order that they may not be able to support their husbands and fathers who are on a strike.² Popularly, the Carnegie strike at Homestead was against a reduction of wages. As a matter of fact, it was nine-tenths a sympathetic lockout. The threatened reduction affected only 325 men, while 3,800 were dismissed.³

The power of such lockouts is plain, and their justification is not difficult. It is a case of "I shall injure you until you stop injuring me." When, however, the idea is extended, and other employers, not injured in any way by the original strikers' action, dismiss their men, the action is less clearly justifiable. Sufficient illustrations of sympathetic lockouts of this type have already been given. Their power is great, but, fortunately for labor, their weakness is often greater. This weakness is inherent in the very nature of the organization by which such lockouts are declared. The agency which organizes and controls contributions to strikers is, regularly, the union of which these strikers form a part. Since most unions follow trade lines, it follows that the men to be locked out for the offence of assisting the original strikers are men employed in the same trade—employed, in fact, by the competitors of the employer originally involved. The sympathetic lockout is, therefore, a weapon which must be wielded by competitors. This fact explains its inherent weakness. As has been pointed out in the preceding pages, it is ordinarily to an employer's interest to have the establishment of any competitor closed. The policy to which this fact would naturally lead—the refusal of assist-

¹ *Strikes and Lockouts in 1890*, p. 253. (Parl. Papers, 1890-1891, v. lxxviii.)

² *New York Times*, June 27, 1879.

³ J. D. Weeks in *Magazine of Christian Literature*, v. 6, p. 373.

ance to competitors under any circumstances—is often subordinated to a more far-sighted policy. An employers' union is formed. All agree to lockout their men in sympathy when any employer is attacked by a strike. But the interest of the individual employers, as competitors, continually asserts itself—sometimes secretly, sometimes openly—and constitutes the fundamental reason why employers' unions are so perishable in their character. When a group of competitors has entered into the above agreement, the temptation is always strong for individual employers to violate it, and to profit by the abundance of trade and the high prices artificially created by the general stoppage. To avoid this breaking of faith, members of employers' federations are frequently obliged to deposit bonds, sometimes as large as \$25,000, to be forfeited if the agreement is not kept. Even then it is often "a matter of calculation with employers whether it will be more advantageous to remain true to their agreement, or, by an abandonment of this, to make extraordinary profits and pay the fine."¹

The great advantage to employers who can thus do business while their competitors are idle is forcibly illustrated by a strike which occurred in Preston, England, in 1853. It represents a plan which is often substituted for the sympathetic lockout. Several thousand cotton employees were on a strike. All the employers in that district were then under an agreement to contribute fixed amounts to any firm attacked by a strike, in order to compensate it for its loss. At the time mentioned, the Preston employers were receiving considerable sums from their competitors in the vicinity in accordance with this agreement. It was openly charged, however, that these neighboring employers were using secret means to prevent an adjustment of the Preston strike. Their profits were so

¹ Brentano, *The Relation of Labor to Law*, p. 132.

great, due to the cessation at Preston, that they were very willing to contribute to the employers there, and to have the struggle continued as long as possible.¹ This lack of sympathy among competitors is further shown by their frequent consents to boycott each other at the request of unions involved in a strike. Three of the four great sympathetic railroad strikes, the Southwestern strike in 1886, the Reading and Burlington strikes in 1888, have furnished illustrations of this. One of the officials of a road which competed with the Burlington was quoted as saying at the time that "he could not see why his road should allow itself to become involved in the strike simply to help the Burlington. It had recently paid no consideration to the desires of its competitors, and there was no reason why the latter should show any consideration to the Burlington now."²

From all this but one conclusion is possible. The power of the sympathetic lockout proves to be enormous, striking as it does at the workmen's most vital point, but its inherent weakness, increasing the more the struggle is prolonged, constitutes a continual and automatic check to its application.

In the foregoing pages the economics of industrial warfare have been examined from the standpoint of one or the other party to the dispute. It is necessary now to study the same problem, noticing the inter-relation of economic power which exists in every case. Disregarding for the present all sympathetic movements, one fact above all others stands out in regard to the relations between Labor and Capital—their continual and necessary interdependence. In his *Stillwater*

¹ *Report on Trades Societies to the Society for the Promotion of Social Science*, 1860, pages 227, 228.

² *Chicago Tribune*, March 7, 1888. Quoted by Salmons in *The Burlington Strike*, p. 297.

Tragedy,¹ Thomas Bailey Aldrich has given this interdependence a humorous but very truthful illustration. One of his characters, speaking of the Siamese twins, is made to say:

"They're dead now, but when they was alive, if you was to pinch one of those fellows, the other would sing out. If you was to black the eye of the left-hand chap, the other one couldn't see for a week. When either of them fetched the other a clip, he knocked himself down. Well, labor and capital is jined just as them two was."

The interdependence of these interesting monstrosities was absolute and equal, and the result, sociologically expressed, was toleration. Were the interdependence of Capital and Labor just as absolute and equal, and were that fact appreciated by both sides, all attempts at disruption would cease—in other words, strikes and lockouts would disappear. It is only because each side regards itself as the less dependent of the two that disruptions occur. The side whose belief upon this point proves to be well founded wins the day, while the relatively greater dependence of the other is established.

Passing now from the original dispute to its sympathetic extension, the case becomes more complicated. The former tested the comparative dependence of disputants upon a continuance of their mutual business relations. The latter tests their comparative dependence upon the continuance of certain other business relations. A sympathetic cessation of work, in other words, tests the dependence of the original employer upon the continuance of his business relations with other parties, as compared with the dependence of his workmen upon a continuance of these same relations. The sympathetic extension of a dispute brings assistance usually to both of the original disputants, but it also in-

¹p. 196.

flicts injury upon both. If an employer believes that to discharge all unaffected workmen will inflict greater injury upon his striking workmen—in the shape of a loss of support—than upon himself—in the shape of a closing of his shop—he inaugurates a sympathetic lockout. If, on the other hand, these workmen, regarding the same problem, conclude that the surplus of injury caused by the sympathetic cessation will fall upon the employer, they declare a sympathetic strike. The same estimating of comparative injury goes on in the minds of outside employers and workmen, when a sympathetic extension beyond the establishment originally involved is contemplated.

Whether the sympathetic extension shall take the form of a sympathetic strike or of a sympathetic lockout, depends, therefore, upon the opinion which is held by the respective sides as to the location of this surplus of injury. A difference of opinion upon this question would mean that each side considered the surplus of injury to be in its favor. Under such circumstances it is manifestly as immaterial as it is difficult to declare the extension either a sympathetic strike or a sympathetic lockout. It is really both. A cessation of work among the coal miners of Australia may be used as an illustration. It is especially significant, for the pressure which it was supposed to exert was so difficult of measurement that a very vigorous discussion arose among two men, both in sympathy with the strikers, as to whether it was a sympathetic strike or a sympathetic lockout. The facts are these: In the midst of the struggle between the sailors and the shipowners, some 7,000 miners stopped work. Mr. Champion, an English socialistic writer, who was in Australia at the time, declared that this cessation of work on the part of the miners was an advantage to the striking seamen. It injured the shipowners severely by cutting off one of their most lucrative branches of trade. It

was in fact, a sympathetic strike.¹ A month or so later, Mr. John D. Fitzgerald, a member of the Labor Council which controlled the strike, denied this statement flatly.² The cessation of work on the part of the miners was, he said, anything but a benefit to the striking seamen. It was probably the most serious injury they sustained. These miners were paying considerable sums to the strikers on the water-front, and when work stopped, they became, instead, financial dependents upon the strike committee. This fact the mine owners appreciated, and instead of being struck against by their employees, they had, in fact, locked them out. It was a sympathetic lockout, not a sympathetic strike at all. The question was thoroughly threshed out before the commission which met shortly after. From the evidence there taken it seems plain that both sides involved in the sympathetic extension regarded the cessation of work as a benefit to their respective friends in the original dispute. The sympathetic strike of the Brooklyn granite workers alluded to on page 56 possessed this same disputed character. A representative of the Granite Cutters National Union put the situation as follows:

"The New England Granite Manufacturers' Association knew that the members of our branch . . . were contributing money to support the (striking) granite cutters . . . of the Eastern quarries, and, in order to shut off this source of revenue for their relief, with the belief that they could thus force the . . . men to accept their terms, they brought their influence to bear on the local Manufacturers' Association to lock us out."³

From this the action would seem to be a sympathetic lockout purely. Up to that time there had been no refusal of the Brooklyn cutters to work upon the stone received

¹ *Nineteenth Century*, v. 29, p. 234.

² *Ibid.*, p. 449.

³ *Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of New York*, 1892, part ii, p. 239.

from New England, no intention, therefore, to declare a sympathetic strike. When, however, the sympathetic lock-out was threatened, they at once refused to touch the objectionable stone, and were, of course, discharged.

Under such circumstances as these the matter of initiative has but little importance. One side merely does what the other is about to do, and the game goes merrily on for a time. Strikes, sympathetic strikes, and sympathetic lock-outs follow each other in rapid and retaliatory succession. In 1892 the engineers in a firm at Jarrow-on-Tyne declared a strike. In order to bring them to submission, the combined employers gave notice that 25 per cent. of the unionists employed in their twenty-one different firms would be locked out. The union immediately made the cessation complete by ordering out the remaining 75 per cent. of their members.¹ This last case has been almost duplicated in the recent engineering dispute in England. From the record given in the official organ of the English Labour Department, the *Labour Gazette*,² the plan of sympathetic extension seems to have been used upon an enormous scale. Early in 1897 the Society of Amalgamated Engineers (machinists they would be called in this country) began an agitation for the eight-hour day and several other concessions touching their working arrangements. The Employers Federation of Engineering Associations refused these demands *in toto*, whereupon a strike was announced to take place within a few days among the men of six firms. Before the date for this strike had arrived, however, the Employers Federation met and resolved

“that in the event of the members of the trades unions represented . . . going out on a strike as threatened in any work-shop belonging to a member of the federated employers, notices will be immediately

¹ *Strikes and Lockouts in 1892*, p. 55. (Parl. Papers, 1894, lxxx, part i.)

² V. 5, pages 196 and 227.

given to the Federation that a reduction of hands of 25 per cent. will take place, of the members of such unions in their employment."

This resolution drew from the union an order that whenever 25 per cent. of their membership should be locked out in accordance with this resolution, the remaining 75 per cent. should declare a strike. On July 13 the sympathetic lock-outs and sympathetic strikes began. Nearly 250 firms became idle, and 27,000 men were left without employment. The ultimate failure of the movement from the workmen's standpoint is well known, and does not concern the present problem.

CHAPTER IV

THE FUTURE AS INDICATED BY THE PAST

THE future of the sympathetic movement—the possibilities which it contains—is, in a sense, the most practical side of the subject. It is, therefore, the side which has received the most attention from writers. Unfortunately, these writers have with hardly an exception been alarmists. Ignoring the necessity of any thorough understanding of the movement before attempting to predict its future, they have seized upon the one fact best suited to their purpose—the possible indefinite extension of strikes through sympathetic action—and have pictured an industrial future of a most threatening sort. These forebodings have received more attention than they deserve. The “machinary” of the sympathetic movement must be studied before the tendencies which it contains can be understood; and a study of this sort gives a very different view of the future from that presented by the prophets of ill. It must be admitted, however, that their view has a superficial justification of considerable strength. The sympathetic movement is the logical accompaniment of the idea of federation. In theory it smacks of socialism. It represents a phase of the labor controversy which arbitration can not touch. “Is Labor or Capital to rule?” is the point at issue, and nothing short of a big fight can determine it. “An injury to one” becomes the *striking* “concern of all.” The movement thus seems to contain within itself the essence of the whole labor problem and to be filled with menace to society. “We intend”

declared a manifesto put forth during the Australian strike "to teach the employer the folly of resistance to our combination. He shall not be allowed to shear wool except by union labor. But if he should succeed in getting the wool off the sheep's back, it may rot in his sheds, for we shall prevent the carriers taking it to the railway; and should he succeed in getting it to the railway, we shall prevent it going to sea, for we shall call out the sailors and the officers; and if it sails we shall prevent its discharge in London, for we shall call out the dock laborers."¹

According to the findings of an Assembly committee, the chief purpose of the longshoremen's sympathetic strike in 1887 was "in order that the power of the organization might be shown to be irresistible, and the foolishness of resisting its mandates be established forever."² The logical limit of such a movement is, of course, the compact organization of Labor by countries, imposing its dicta upon a frightened people under threat of a general paralyzing of industry.

The one great and fatal difficulty with any such scheme as this is the very commonplace fact that it will not work. Sympathetic strikes, at their best, involve losses which often completely annihilate their advantages. These losses were enumerated in the preceding chapter. When a sympathetic strike is extended to the threatening size of the Chicago strike of 1894, the losses to the side which initiates the movement become enormous. In mathematical language, they increase directly with the extension of the strike while the advantage to be gained remains constant. Reasoning thus *a priori*, the impolicy of the colossal sympathetic strike seems to be proved. More important, however, is the belief of the laboring men upon this point. Are *they* opposed to such sympathetic strikes on the ground of their impolicy—their very doubtful value? On this point the evidence at

¹ *The Engineering Magazine*, v. 5, p. 3.

² *New York Assembly Documents*, 1887, No. 69, p. 9.

first seems very contradictory. Condemnation of sympathetic action and refusals to participate in it are common. On the other hand stands the very patent fact that such action is indulged in by large unions, sometimes upon an enormous scale. The explanation of this seeming contradiction is indicated in the following quotation from the report of the English Royal Commission on Labour:

"The evidence received by the commission points to the conclusion that on the whole and notwithstanding occasional conflicts on a very large scale, the increased strength of organizations may tend toward the maintenance of harmonious relations between employers and employees. The experience seems to be that the most quarrelsome period of a trade's existence is when it is just emerging from the patriarchal condition in which each employer governs his establishment and deals with his men with no outside interference, but has not yet fully entered into that other condition in which transactions take place between strong associations fully recognizing each other."¹

No one fact in trade union history is better established than this. Writers seem to vie with each other in their descriptions of this "militant stage" of labor organizations. Even "Jeshurun," the bull of Scriptural fame, who "waxed fat and kicked," is demurely led in by one author by way of illustration.²

With this fact in regard to strikes of the ordinary type so generally recognized, it is natural to expect a somewhat similar attitude in regard to sympathetic strikes, and the facts justify this expectation. Newly formed unions, controlled by impetuous and sometimes unscrupulous leaders, easily become elated with success gained in limited contests, and, sighing for more worlds to conquer, enter eagerly upon a

¹ *Final Report of the Royal Commission on Labour*, pages 35 and 36. (Parl. Papers, 1894, v. xxxv.)

² *The National Review*, v. 14, p. 639.

career of sympathetic strikes. This career soon ends in a disastrous defeat, and when at length the union emerges, it is pledged to a perpetual conservatism in regard to such strikes in the future. The main purpose of this chapter is to show from trade union and strike history that this is not an imaginary but an actual picture.

The sympathetic strike on the Southwestern Railroad system in 1886 exceeded anything of the sort this country had ever seen.¹ Originating on the Texas and Pacific Railroad, it was soon extended sympathetically to the entire Missouri Pacific. At one time, 12,000 men were out of employment, and on 4,500 miles of railroad scarcely any freight was moved. In some districts traffic was so thoroughly stopped that the emigrant trains of pioneer days began again to find their way from place to place, loaded with provisions.² The failure of the movement was complete. More than four-fifths of the strikers lost their positions, and not a single concession was made by the railway.³

The Knights of Labor, the organization which was behind the strike, was, at that time, as a non-secret body, but six years old. The district assembly which was directly concerned, had been in existence less than a year.⁴ Throughout the country the organization was at the acme of its power. In the preceding year, the Missouri Pacific had been defeated in a struggle with its men not then organized as Knights of Labor.⁵ Recognizing the power of the organization, the railroad had treated it with a deference which is almost amazing. On two previous occasions, it had acceded to the request made by Knights of Labor officials to boycott

¹ The chief authority for the facts stated in regard to this strike is the report of the Congressional Committee. (*House Reports*, v. iii, 49th Cong., 2d Session.)

² *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, v. i, p. 204.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

⁴ *Report*, Part i, p. 2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pages 2 and 4.

roads on which strikes were pending.¹ When the dispute arose in 1886 on the Texas and Pacific, officials of the Missouri Pacific again agreed to refuse to handle cars from the offending road.² That the strike was extended to the Missouri Pacific in spite of this concession, only indicates the reckless character of the movement. From the admission of Knights, summoned before the committee, it is clear that there was only the slightest conception on the part of the Missouri Pacific strikers as to the cause of their strike.³ Their Assembly had ordered it, and that was enough for them. Their confidence in the judgment of the Assembly was natural, for its power to gain concession from the railroads was apparently great. But for this confidence such a strike as took place would have been impossible. That this confidence was severely shaken by the result of the strike, is observable in the "constitutional history" of the order. At the time of the strike there existed only the slightest safeguards against unwise or hasty action in regard to strikes.⁴ The general assembly had no official control over the district and local assemblies upon such matters, while it was left to the district assemblies to adopt "such rules and regulations as they deem best." At a special session of the organization held two months later, a temporary rule was adopted, providing that no strike could be ordered by an assembly except by a two-thirds secret vote of all the members to be involved, and that such a vote might be repeated in course of the strike as to the advisability of continuing the struggle. No assembly could request financial aid from other assemblies unless the strike had been sanctioned by

¹ *Report*, Part i, pages vii-ix and xviii.

² *Ibid.*, Part i, p. 259.

³ *Ibid.*, Part i, pages 118, 126, 127, 128, 147, 150, 179 and 183.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Part i, p. 22 and Part ii, p. 468. See also an article by Carroll D. Wright on the Knights of Labor in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, v. i, p. 162.

the general executive board. For the Knights of Labor, the most bellicose organization in the country, this was very advanced doctrine, and it is not surprising that the rule was never made a part of the constitution.¹ Other lessons were needed before a thorough conservatism upon the question of strikes and sympathetic strikes alike became a policy of the order.

The attitude of Grand Master Powderly toward the strike is instructive, since he undoubtedly represented the best judgment of the organization. This attitude had been consistently that of disapproval. The strike was ordered without his knowledge and continued against his advice.² To Governor Martin of Kansas he declared that it was "without need or cause." In fact, Powderly has always been opposed to strikes of every sort. He declared on one occasion that he had "never yet gone willingly into a strike."³ "Strikes are a failure," was his opinion still in 1891. Within a few weeks after the close of the Southwestern strike he issued a "secret circular" to all assemblies of the organization. This document was moderate almost to an extreme. Organization was urged rather than strikes.⁴

The decline of the Knights of Labor from the time of this great defeat, is a matter of history.⁵ From a membership of 500,000 in 1886, it had reached 150,000 in 1895.⁶ The impolicy of such sympathetic strikes was thus shown in 1886,

¹ In the constitution of the order as amended in 1892, it is provided (p. 69) that if a local Assembly strikes without the permission of its district Assembly, it loses its charter. If a district Assembly declares a strike without the consent of its state Assembly, no assistance of any kind is rendered by this latter body. Finally, if either state or district Assembly enter into strikes without the sanction of the general executive board, they receive no help from branches outside those directly engaged in the strike.

² *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, v. i, p. 12. ³ *Cosmopolitan*, v. 12, p. 158.

⁴ *New York Times*, March 27, 1886. ⁵ *Engineering Magazine*, v. 6, p. 310.

⁶ Wright, *Industrial Evolution of the United States*, p. 248.

but it was several years before assemblies in other parts of the country became convinced upon this point. In 1887 there was a disastrous sympathetic strike, ordered by the Knights of Labor, among the longshoremen in New York city and the vicinity. It originated in a wage dispute among the coal heavers at Elizabethport, and was extended sympathetically to all workmen who were asked to handle coal received from the offending employer.¹ Even coal cart drivers in New York struck and the price of coal at one time reached \$12.00 per ton. Contemporaneous with this sympathetic strike was another under the same auspices. The refusal of the Old Dominion Steamship Company to consent to a certain method of payment led to a strike of its freight handlers. For a while the trans-Atlantic steamship companies which are accustomed to reship freight received from the Old Dominion line, refused to touch such freight, fearing a strike of their own freight handlers in sympathy. In a short time 1500 tons of freight had accumulated on the wharves of the Old Dominion line. The trans-Atlantic companies weakened later, however, and the sympathetic strikes were declared. The total number of strikers has been put at 27,000, the wages lost at \$3,000,000 and the losses to other individuals at \$43,300,000. The latter strike failed absolutely, while that in behalf of the coal shovelers at Elizabethport resulted in a compromise. At an expense of three million dollars, eighty-five men received an additional two and a half cents per hour for their work.

Such results could not but have their influence upon Knights of Labor in all parts of the country. That this influence was felt is indicated by the fact that but one other sympathetic strike on a large scale has been declared by the

¹ For a detailed account of this strike and the one next mentioned see the *Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of New York, 1887*, pages 327-385.

organization since that time. This last great sympathetic uprising occurred upon the Reading Railroad in 1888, and was declared on account of sympathy with miners in the so-called "Lehigh region" of Pennsylvania.¹ The output of this region is largely in the hands of the Lehigh Valley Railroad, the railroad company in fact controlling a large share of the mines, although under other names.² During the strike in the "Lehigh region," the mines in the "Schuylkill," the other great anthracite region of Pennsylvania, were running full time instead of three-quarters as previously. Since the mines in this Schuylkill region were controlled by the Reading Railroad in the usual manner,³ it was possible for this latter road to profit extensively by the shut-down in the Lehigh region. The two companies, however, were beyond the stage of competition. They preferred to assist each other in emergencies rather than to profit at each other's expense. Accordingly, the Reading began to supply coal to the Lehigh to enable it to fill its orders and retain its trade.⁴ In order to put an end to such assistance, a sympathetic strike was declared by all members of the Knights of Labor employed upon the entire Reading system, some 6,500 men.⁵ The effort failed absolutely. The Lehigh miners, after a strike of seven or eight months, returned to work upon their employers' terms.⁶

Although this was the last sympathetic strike of any magnitude ordered by the Knights of Labor, attempts have been made since that time by the officials to bring about such strikes. This was notably the case in 1894. During the Chicago strike, Grand Master Sovereign did his utmost to cause a grand sympathetic uprising over the whole coun-

¹ The official account of this strike is found in the report of the Congressional Committee upon the subject. (*House Reports*, No. 4147, 50th Cong., 2d Sess.)

² *Ibid.*, pages lxxxvi and 534.

³ *Ibid.*, pages iii and vii.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pages ciii, cvi, 74 and 76.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. cxii.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. vii.

try. His appeal,¹ or command, for it was both, was disregarded almost universally, a most striking proof that the union had long since passed the stage of mammoth sympathetic strikes, and had developed a conservatism upon the subject which even the impetuosity of the leaders could not break down.

The history of the Knights of Labor in regard to sympathetic strikes divides itself, therefore, into three periods. First, 1881-1886, a period in which the organization was young, continually increasing in strength and increasingly confident of its power; second, 1886-1888, a belligerent period, during which its power was tested by sympathetic strikes on a large scale; third, 1888 to the present, a period of conservatism on the part of the membership toward such strikes. Sympathetic strikes are still declared, but never on such an extensive and threatening scale as during the preceding period. The history of the Knights of Labor has been presented at considerable length, because that organization above all others has been identified with the sympathetic movement in this country and its history is, therefore, very significant. Sympathetic strikes were first used by the Knights of Labor, and are most vigorously defended by them. "An injury to one is the concern of all" is the motto of the organization.² Its most distinctive feature, the close union of different trades into one body, makes it admirably fitted for the management of sympathetic strikes. As was shown above, the economically most powerful sympathetic strike is not that which involves men in the same trade, but that which cuts an employer off from his business

¹This appeal, as recorded in the *Journal of the Knights of Labor* (July 12, 1894), was as follows: "I appeal to you, imploring you to lay down the implements of toil for a season, and you are further requested not to return to your usual avocations until a settlement of the existing troubles."

² *Report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the State of Illinois, 1882, p. 274.*

connections, and strikes of this latter type must cross trade lines. For sympathetic striking of the former and weaker sort, the ordinary trades union is adapted; but when trade lines are to be crossed and sympathetic strikes declared, these naturally prove less efficient than the assemblies of the Knights of Labor, which include under one organization both the trade originally affected and the trades to be mobilized in their behalf.

The history of the Knights of Labor repeats itself in the case of the American Railway Union. A young union, formed in 1893,¹ becoming imbued with a sense of its power from a brief period of success—the Great Northern strike preceded the Chicago strike by but six months and was substantially a victory for the men²—enters readily into a mammoth contest only to be disastrously defeated, and to develop a conservative policy for the future. After three very peaceful years the organization has now become merged into the Brotherhood of the Co-operative Commonwealth, and has disappeared, therefore, as a factor in the sympathetic strike problem.³ This history of the American Railway Union's attitude is the more significant because, in its attempt to embrace all trades employed by railroad companies, it resembled the Knights of Labor, and was, therefore, best adapted to use the sympathetic strike as a weapon against an offending employer.

The four strikes just described represent the most conspicuous instances of sympathetic striking which this country has ever seen, and the tendencies which they show may be regarded as typical. It remains now to examine, in some

¹ *Report on the Chicago Strike by the United States Strike Commission*, 1894, p. xxiii.

² Wright, *Industrial Evolution of the United States*, p. 314.

³ See the *Railway Times*, June 15, 1897, and following; also its successor, the *Social Democrat*.

detail, the great sympathetic strikes which have occurred in other countries, in order to see if the same tendencies are apparent there also.

The sympathetic movement in Australia, referred to in an earlier chapter, is in exact line with the two cases just considered. The culminating point was reached in the great strike of 1890.¹ On the admission of both sides, a large proportion of the strikers were out "on principle" as they called it. The original strikers were marine officers at the port of Melbourne. They left work rather than give up their right to affiliate with other trades unions—a right which the ship-owners refused to admit. As fast as non-union men were used in place of striking unionists, the strike was extended to firemen, cooks, stewards, wharf laborers and coal lumpers, until traffic at all ports of the island was at a standstill.² Thus far the strike was limited to the water front. It was soon extended, however, to coal and silver miners in different parts of the island,³ and later to members of the Shearers' Union, some 20,000 men. As in the great sympathetic movements in this country, the result was a disastrous failure.⁴ The subsequent history of strikes in Australia, as given above, proves that this experience has had its usual effect upon the unions involved. No sympathetic strike upon that continent since 1891 has attained sufficient dimensions to attract the attention of the outside world.

Although England's great sympathetic strike at the London docks occurred in 1889, two years earlier than the Australian strike, its description has been deferred because it

¹ The authority for this strike is the report referred to above, p. 9.

² *Ibid.*, Appendix M (2).

³ For the contention that the former was a sympathetic lockout, see above, p. 76.

⁴ *Nineteenth Century*, v. 29, p. 236.

presents a seeming contradiction to the conclusion indicated by the history of other large sympathetic strikes.

In every respect the London dock strike of 1889 was one of the most remarkable events in the history of labor.¹ Forty thousand men refused to work, and for over a month the great port of London stood idle. The strike originated among the dockers, some 3,000 in number.² Within a week after the dockers' refusal to work, sympathetic strikes had been declared among seamen, coalhandlers, wharf laborers and stevedores. From the economic standpoint, the most remarkable fact about the strike was its success. It seems to contradict the almost universal rule that a sympathetic strike on such a scale is doomed to failure because of the financial injury it inflicts upon the originators. It is natural, therefore, to look for some exceptional circumstances which will explain this altogether exceptional result. That circumstance proves to be the almost universal sympathy of the public with the strikers. Nearly every paper in London championed their cause. Members of Parliament worked hand in hand with the strike leaders. Retail dealers extended credit to the struggling families, "pawnbrokers refused interest, and lodging-house keepers refused their rent. In one memorable case an employer himself gave strike pay to his men when under a sense of social duty they left his works empty."³ Contributions poured in on every side. A handsome sum was raised by the stock exchange in a few minutes, while £30,000 came all the way from Australia—an expression of sympathy without a paral-

¹ For the official account of this strike see *Strikes and Lockouts in 1889*, p. 31. (Parl. Papers, 1890, v. lxxviii.) A most readable account, and one very carefully written, is contained in *The Dockers' Strike*, by Smith and Nash.

² *Bradstreet's*, v. 17, p. 549.

³ Frederick Harrison in the *Nineteenth Century*, v. 26, pages 722 and 723.

lel in all the conflicts of labor.¹ Such practical assistance to strikers under any condition is remarkable, but that it should be given to men striking in sympathy is absolutely unique. The assumed injustice of sympathetic attacks accounts for the usual indisposition of the public to assist such undertakings financially. Three considerations, however, made the dockers' strike exceptional in this regard. In the first place the original grievance was excessive, and of a nature easily understood. The dockers' employment was of the most irregular sort, and their wages pitifully low. Their occupation, the unloading of vessels, was, moreover, so totally unskilled that their strike could have accomplished nothing alone, and the public appreciated this fact. A third exceptional feature was the entire absence of violence. A few weeks after the contest had ended, the Recorder at London, in charging the Grand Jury, remarked that there was not on the calendar a single case arising from the strike. "The whole history of the world," he added, "does not show so wonderful an instance of self-control on the part of suffering men with starving wives and children."²

The foregoing is probably sufficient to explain the success which this great strike attained. As an exhibition of militant unionism in its best form, it is unsurpassed. Because of these exceptional features it can hardly, however, be regarded as a fair illustration of the sympathetic movement. As was shown above, sympathetic strikes in England since 1889 have averaged ten each year. In 1892 but two were recorded. The success of the dockers' strike has not, therefore, had any very great influence in creating a belief in the efficacy of sympathetic strikes. The experience of England in regard to extensive and threatening sympathetic

¹ Balance sheet of the Strike Fund. Appendix to *The Dockers' Strike*, by Smith and Nash.

² Smith and Nash, *The Dockers' Strike*, p. 109.

strikes differs, therefore, from the experience of this country and Australia in one respect only. A gigantic failure was required to convince unionists in the latter cases of the inefficiency of such methods, while the English unionists seem to have become convinced without any such bitter experience. At any rate, the conviction has come and there is little probability that sympathetic extensions of strikes will figure extensively in the industrial future of England.

The most conspicuous feature in regard to all the strikes just described is the power or influence of the leaders. To the average man the chief function of a labor leader is "ordering strikes," and the ordering of sympathetic strikes right and left is supposed to be his highest delight. It is important to know the truth in the matter, but almost impossible to discover it. Controversies have raged about this question in the case of each of the great sympathetic strikes described above. The supporters of unions point to rules for the ordering of strikes by ballot—and they are legion—and explain that strikes are often said to be ordered when the leader only promulgates or ratifies what has been ordered by the members. To this their opponents reply that rules are set aside in the heat of a struggle, or that the "primaries are packed" in the interests of a strike vote, and numerous instances confirm their position.¹ The unionists again insist that their leaders' so-called "order" is merely a request or an advice,² but it is replied that requests in many cases have all the force of orders, as results have often shown.

Under such circumstances generalizations are manifestly impossible. Even if the same degree of paper democ-

¹ As to the "packing of the primaries," see *The National Magazine*, v. 15, p. 374. As to the setting aside of rules, see *Report of the New South Wales Commission on Strikes, 1891, Evidence*, Qs. 4124-4128, and 4133-4136.

² *Ibid.*, *Evidence*, Qs. 4120-4122.

racy had been attained in all unions, there would still be the greatest variation in the amount of actual democracy used when strikes are considered. The ordering of a strike is not the act of a union as such, tied down by rules and hampered by a constitution. It is essentially the act of a "crowd" in Le Bon's use of that word.¹ The men act as a unit, and the real leaders, who are usually the official leaders as well, decide what that action shall be. It is thus a matter of indifference whether the leaders order the strike, or whether they merely execute the decision of the members and promulgate the order. It is their decision in either case. The influence of leaders is even more important in the case of sympathetic strikes than in strikes of the ordinary type, but it is retained only so long as they win their battles. The Knights of Labor on the Southwestern system in 1886 voted to give their officials standing permission to order a strike at any time for the recognition of the union,² and 9,000 men responded when the order came, while Grand Master Sovereign appealed almost in vain for a general strike in sympathy with the workers at Pullman in 1894.³

The contention that sympathetic strikes mark the indiscretion of young unions finds its corollary in the fact that established unions are almost uniformly opposed to such action. No union in this country has a better name than the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers.⁴ Its opposition to the policy of strikes in general is well-known, and sympa-

¹ Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd*. See especially book iii, chap. v.

² *House Reports*, 49th Cong., 2d Sess., v. iii, p. xi.

³ See above, p. 86.

⁴ Austin Corbin, speaking of the Locomotive Engineers, remarked, in 1888, that he "would as soon have a contract with them as with Drexel, Morgan & Co." (*House Reports*, no. 4147, 50th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 80.)

thetic strikes are especially condemned. Speaking of the Southwestern strike President Arthur remarked, "Mr. Powderly should have ordered the Knights of Labor back to work on the Missouri Pacific or revoked their charters when they acknowledged that they had no grievance."¹ Hardly a railroad strike of any importance has occurred without attempts being made to induce the engineers to come out in sympathy. During the Southwestern strike they were appealed to and threatened, but all to no effect.² At the Buffalo strike in 1892,³ and at the Chicago strike in 1894⁴ the same policy was maintained. As a result of this conservatism, the engineers are bitterly hated by the Knights of Labor. "Codfish aristocracy" they are sometimes called by their enemies.⁵

But one sympathetic strike of any magnitude appears in the entire history of the organization. It originated in 1888 on the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad, and demands recognition here since it stands as the one exception to the order's steadfast opposition to such strikes both before and since that time.⁶ The original dispute on the "Burlington" was in regard to wages. The engineers who struck in sympathy were employed on three different roads having business relations with the Burlington. Several facts about this sympathetic extension are significant. In the first place, the action of the engineers did not cross trade lines. Strikers

¹ The New York *Times*, March 27, 1886.

² *House Reports*, 49th Cong., 2d Sess., v. iii, p. xvi.

³ New York *Times*, Aug. 23, 1892, p. 2, and Aug. 25, p. 1.

⁴ *Report of the United States Commission on the Chicago Strike*, 1894, p. 154.

⁵ *Journal of the Knights of Labor*, July 26, 1894, quoting *Coast Seaman's Journal*.

⁶ The most complete information in regard to this strike is found in *The Burlington Strike*, by C. H. Salmons, a work which seems to possess a semi-official character.

and sympathetic strikers alike—all were engineers. There seems to have been, therefore, a tentative belief at any rate in sympathetic strikes, which were in this way confined to their own trade and organization. It is true that toward the end of the struggle, sympathetic strikes were declared by switchmen on the Burlington and upon the Chicago and Alton, but the action in both these cases was not taken at the request of the engineers, and cannot be regarded as giving any indication of the policy of the order.¹ As a second fact, it is to be noted that the sympathetic strikes were not begun until the original dispute had been in progress for several weeks, and when the probability of its failure had become great. The railroad had made public announcement of its intended resumption of business, using non-union engineers, of course. The sympathetic extension was, therefore, a last resort. Even when the sympathetic strikes were declared, the greatest hesitancy was displayed in taking so radical a step. The engineers on the Chicago, Burlington and Northern (a railroad built in the interests of the Burlington, and acting as its feeder, connecting it with St. Paul) asked their employers to boycott Burlington cars, and threatened to strike if their request was refused. The railroad company did refuse the request, but the men did not strike until they had made a second attempt and had been a second time refused.² But the most important fact in regard to these sympathetic strikes has yet to be mentioned. In at least two of the three cases referred to above, they were declared in spite of the advice of the Central Executive Council and the Grand Master, Mr. Arthur.³ The strike on the Santa Fe system was declared without Mr. Arthur's knowledge, and was abandoned within three days at his request.⁴ For this step

¹ *The Burlington Strike*, pages 348, 349, 354, and ff. ² *Ibid.*, pages 304–306.

³ *Ibid.*, pages 306 and 335.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pages 335 and 341.

Mr. Arthur was severely criticised in some quarters.¹ A deputation of six engineers from the Burlington succeeded in inducing the striking engineers on the Central Iowa to return to their work.² This fact is most significant, indicating as it does that the departure of the organization from its established policy represents the temporary breaking away of a more or less hot-headed section from the judgment of the more experienced leaders. The strike, therefore, only strengthens the contention made above, that strong and well-established unions stand practically as a unit in their opposition to sympathetic strikes, and especially to sympathetic strikes on a large scale.

As another illustration of this opposition, the Brotherhood of Railway Brakemen might be cited. The brakemen on the Union Pacific in 1886 declared a strike in sympathy with the Southwestern strike then in progress, but at the next convention of the body their action was promptly repudiated. Twenty-six members were expelled and thirty others suspended for their participation in the movement.³ During the switchmen's strike at Buffalo in 1892, an effort was made to involve in the struggle all organizations of railroad men. The Grand Masters of the firemen's, trainmen's and conductors' organizations decided against advising such a step after two hours' conference with Grand Master Sovereign, of the Switchmen's Union. "Not an argument was advanced," remarked Grand Master Sargent afterward, "except that we ought to act from sympathy. *Our organizations do not believe in sympathetic strikes.*"⁴

The Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers has among its rules a provision stating that if "the executive

¹ *The Burlington Strike*, pages 340 and 343.

² *Ibid.*, p. 342.

³ *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, v. i, p. 219.

⁴ *New York Times*, Aug. 25, 1892, p. 1.

committee of a district or division find it necessary to legalize a strike in any one department of a mill or works, it is required that the men of all other departments shall also cease work until the difference is settled.”¹ It is apparent, however, that sympathetic strikes which would be inaugurated because of this provision belong to the first class of sympathetic strikes—confined to one establishment—and are, therefore, limited in size. When the Homestead dispute was extended sympathetically to the 2,000 men employed in the Carnegie mills at Pittsburgh, the Amalgamated Association declined to authorize the movement and to pay strike benefits to those who had thus left their work.²

In addition to the evidence already given to show that large sympathetic strikes are extremely improbable in the future, one further fact needs to be noted. Even the most radical leaders seem to realize that there is a point beyond which sympathetic extension cannot go without bringing disaster to the cause it aims to help. In each of the great sympathetic strikes of history there have been efforts to bring about a grand suspension of industry, and in two of these cases the project has been voted down by the leaders themselves.

It seems fairly certain that the strike on the Southwestern system in 1886 would have been extended to the entire Union Pacific but for the efforts of Mr. Powderly.³ In Australia a motion to request a general sympathetic strike was defeated,⁴ while the extension of the strike from the water front laborers to the sheep shearers was made against vigorous opposition and the action was rescinded within three

¹ Carroll D. Wright, in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. vii, p. 428.

² *The New York Times*, July 16, 1892, p. 5.

³ *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. i, p. 212.

⁴ New South Wales *Report on Strikes*, 1891, *Evidence*, Q. 4207.

days.¹ In course of this discussion the President of the Shearers' Union showed that he realized the immense losses which such a sympathetic extension would involve. He enumerated these as follows :

" 1. Breaking of agreement with employers and consequent forfeiture of back wages due.

" 2. Imprisonment in default of fines.

" 3. Public opinion would be turned against the strikers.

" 4. We would be no longer able to help the maritime strikers financially."²

During the entire progress of this strike the leaders were obliged to use their utmost powers of persuasion to prevent the declaring of sympathetic strikes among unions of every sort. Three deputations a week were sent to the gas stokers to induce them to remain at work.³ The building trades and even the butchers wanted to come out in sympathy, but were induced by the council to remain at work.⁴ In all, it was said, two-thirds of the organizations which wanted to declare sympathetic strikes were persuaded to abandon the plan. One amusing side of the struggle deserves mention, for it also illustrates the difficulties which confront the leaders of sympathetic strikes. During such a time of strikes men who continued at work were naturally branded as disloyal to the cause of Labor. To relieve these men from the humiliation of their position and to show to all comers that their remaining at work was sanctioned and in fact desired by the leaders of the strike, a system of permits was devised. These were issued by the Defence Committee and distributed to all who remained at work in accordance with their request.⁵

¹ New South Wales *Report on Strikes*, 1891, *Appendix*, p. 10.

² *Ibid.*, *Appendix C.* (1), pages 10 and 11.

³ *Ibid.*, *Evidence*, Q. 1865.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Evidence*, Q. 3810, 3870.

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Evidence*, Q. 1866.

The leaders of the strike at the London docks were confronted with the same problem. Unions began to declare sympathetic strikes on every side. In order to check this tendency, which they regarded with alarm, the leaders were obliged to issue a manifesto, warning all who declared such strikes that they would receive no assistance whatever from the strike committee.¹ At a later period, when the prospect of success was slightest, the strike leaders seem to have weakened somewhat. After an all-night debate, a motion requesting such a general sympathetic suspension was actually carried.² The opposition which this request aroused was so great, however, that it was withdrawn before the appointed day arrived.³

The Chicago strike is the one case where leaders of the local strike seemed to have been unconscious that anything but good could accrue to their cause by sympathetic strikes in all branches of industry. President Debs, of the American Railway Union, appeared before the Affiliated Trades of Chicago, and later before the conference of Federation of Labor officials. According to his testimony before the Federal Commission, he refused even to advise these bodies as to their duty. When pressed, however, to state what he would do if in their place, he advocated the sympathetic strike. That this cautiousness was probably greater in the presence of the Commission than it had been before the conferences, is evidenced by the fact, admitted by Mr. Debs himself, that these officials had come to Chicago upon his express invitation.⁴

Some of the strikes referred to in previous pages have

¹ *Strikes and Lockouts in 1889*, p. 31. (Parl. Papers, 1890, v. lxviii.)

² Smith and Nash, *The Dockers' Strike*, pages 74, 75.

³ *Ibid.*, pages 123-125.

⁴ *Testimony and Proceedings*, pages 154 and 155.

passed beyond trades union lines and have involved whole federations. It is, therefore, important to notice the attitude of federations in general toward sympathetic striking.

A federation of all the unions in one locality is naturally an organization well adapted to inaugurate and control sympathetic strikes. Such federations are usually known as Central Labor Unions, though at least a half dozen other names are in use.¹ Seventy-four federations of this sort exist in various cities of this country, over half of which have been formed during the last two years. The attitude of these bodies toward sympathetic strikes is negative almost without an exception. Of the twenty-three constitutions examined, none make any formal provision for sympathetic strikes, but there is, on the other hand, no prohibition of such action. Provisions for strikes of the ordinary type appear in almost every case. Usually too it is stipulated that all affiliated unions shall give financial assistance to strikes approved by the central body. If such assistance is not rendered, the union in question forfeits the right to demand similar assistance when it is in need. The following, taken from the constitution of the Duluth Federated Trades Assembly, is the nearest approach to a formal authorization of sympathetic striking. "In case of a strike, the assembly shall take such action as it may deem proper to gain the desired end."² In other cases, the authorization is even more indefinite. The constitution of the Central Labor Union of New York provides that after arbitration has failed and a strike has been sanctioned, "a call shall be made upon all trade and labor organizations represented in this Union to assist the one in difficulty."³ There thus seems to be an

¹ For information in regard to Central Labor Unions, I am indebted to Mr. W. M. Burke, who has placed at my disposal the results of investigations which he has made upon the subject, but has not printed as yet.

² Article vii, section I.

³ Article x, section I.

unwillingness to make formal declaration in favor of sympathetic strikes or to provide for their inauguration. That sympathetic strikes are inaugurated by these central labor unions is well known, but it is also known that such strikes never assume very alarming proportions. The reason is plain. These unions are federations in the strict sense of that word. Their power in the matter of strikes is advisory only. Strikes must be "ordered" by majorities within each union. Each affiliated union, therefore, decides whether it will join the sympathetic movement or not. Under these circumstances a general suspension of industry is an improbability, if not absolutely impossible.

In addition to Central Labor Unions, many cities contain federations of a different type, called usually "Allied Trades Councils." These bodies are even better adapted to the using of sympathetic strikes than the Central Labor Unions. They are found chiefly in the printing and building trades. In 1896 an agreement was entered into by three unions in the former trades, the International Typographical Union, the International Printing Pressmen Union, and the International Brotherhood of Bookbinders. In case of a dispute involving the members of one union in an office or offices, sympathetic strikes are to be declared by other unions in the same office or offices according to a detailed method of procedure. After such a strike has been regularly ordered, any member who disregards the order shall be promptly expelled. The expense of supporting all who strike must be "borne by the initiating Union."¹ But the importance of this declaration must not be overestimated. Sympathetic strikes in the printing trades are almost entirely confined to Class I. as described in the preceding chapter. The original strike is extended sympathetically only to other workmen

¹ *Report of the International Typographical Union*, 1896, pages 10 and 16.

in the same establishment. Such strikes are, therefore, necessarily small, and demand no attention here.¹

Most of the city federations just described are themselves affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. Since this organization embodies the ideas of federation in their very best form, it is important to learn its attitude toward the policy of sympathetic strikes. The same recognition of the self-government of the affiliated bodies which was mentioned in the case of the Central Labor Unions is true of the American Federation of Labor. The opposition which developed in 1888 and 1889 against the system of compulsory financial assistance to strikes involving affiliated unions, indicates the extreme conservatism of the organization.² On one occasion the Executive Council has been obliged to render a direct decision upon the question of sympathetic strike. A musicians' union in St. Louis had refused to declare a sympathetic strike in order to assist the union of theatrical employees, on the ground that its members would have been obliged to violate contracts existing with their employers. The Theatrical Union thereupon requested the Executive Council to revoke the charter of the musicians' union. The request was refused on the ground that "the constitutional autonomy accorded affiliated bodies prohibits them from interfering with *bona fide* contracts of local unions."³ When this action of the Executive Council came before the convention for approval, the secretary of the Federation made the following explanation:

"The Executive Council must not be considered, in deciding as it

¹ Of the 124 strikes which occurred in the printing trades of New York State, during the period of the last United States report, eight were sympathetic strikes. In five of these eight cases the sympathetic strikers were confined to the service of the offending employer. The average number of workmen who declared the original strike was twenty-eight, while fourteen of their fellows on the average came out in sympathy.

² *Report of the American Federation of Labor*, 1889, pages 32 and 34.

³ *Report*, 1895, p. 31.

did in this case, to be opposed to sympathetic strikes. On the contrary, we were banded together to help one another. The words union, federation, implied it. An organization which held aloof when assistance could be given to a sister organization, was deserving of censure, but not to the extent of expulsion from a central body or from the Federation. There was a limit to the assistance which we could exact. The organization itself must ultimately decide. It was the over-riding of this limit, the demanding more than was tendered, that disrupted the K. of L."

A motion was then carried by the convention suggesting that the council "convey to the unions, in such way as it thinks proper, not to tie themselves up with contracts so they cannot help each other when able."¹

From this discussion, the attitude of the Federation toward ordinary sympathetic strikes must be plain. Although unable through the nature of its organization to take action in such matters, it declares its belief in the policy leaving it to the judgment of the affiliated unions to decide the individual cases as they arise.

In one instance the Executive Council has been called upon to pass on the advisability of a "grand suspension of labor," and here its deliverance has a different sound. Acting in accordance with the invitation from President Debs of the American Railway Union, a session of the Council was held at Chicago during the strike of 1894. The statement issued at that time is big with meaning in regard to the future of sympathetic strikes. Sympathy was expressed with the strikers, but, in the opinion of the Council, it "would be unwise and disastrous to the interests of labor to extend the strike any further than it has already gone."² Although this action of the Executive Council was severely condemned in some quarters, it received the unanimous approval of the convention which met in the following Decem-

¹ *Report*, 1895, pages 103 and 104.

² *Ibid.*, 1894, p. 12.

ber.¹ This historic statement, therefore, registers the Federation's unqualified disapproval of the universal suspension project. Did it condemn the sympathetic extension which had already taken place—the railroad sympathetic strike? Apparently not. Sympathy was expressed with this strike, and it was declared disastrous to extend it "any further than it had already gone." Reading between the lines, however, and considering the previous conservatism of the Federation, it is safe to assume that it would never have advised a strike of this sort, although after it was in progress the Council could not very well express its disapproval. Its expression of sympathy was in no way a commitment, and it helped to allay the resentment felt at its refusal to advise a general suspension of work.

The attitude of English federations toward sympathetic strikes is decidedly favorable, if this is to be judged only by their rules. The Federation of Trades and Labor Unions connected with Shipping, Carrying and Other Industries, formed in 1891, contained among its objects the following: "In the event of any dispute in any trade connected with this Federation which may have the sanction of the Executive Council to withdraw the other members of the Federation in support thereof if necessary."² The Printing and Kindred Trades Federation, formed in the same year, aims "to resist any attack made by any employer upon any branch of the trades in detail by withdrawing simultaneously if necessary the whole of the workmen employed."³ The rules of the Miners' Federation, one of the strongest in England, state "that whenever any county federation or district is attacked on the wage question . . . all members of the society shall tender a notice to terminate their contracts."⁴

¹ *Report*, 1894, page 29.

² *The Economic Journal*, v. iii, p. 419.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 422.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 417.

To inaugurate such strikes, however, the sanction of the Central Executive body must be gained, and the history of sympathetic strikes in England shows that this has only rarely been accomplished. The Dock, Wharf and General Riverside Union at London, the very center of the "new union" movement, had its belief in the efficacy of sympathetic strikes put to a severe test in 1890. This union was requested to declare a strike in sympathy with the waterfront laborers in Australia, and thus prevent the discharge of ships from that country. In reply the London union resolved, "that ships from Australia be not blocked now, as by so doing we should weaken our power to render that monetary assistance to our Australian brethren which we desire to give by remaining in employment."¹

In a number of instances federations have assumed international proportions, and a few attempts have been made to commit these organizations to sympathetic strikes. Mention has already been made of the international sympathetic strike which was voted by the International Conference of Miners held in Paris in 1891. The fact that the sympathetic strikes never took place is significant, indicating, as it does, the better judgment of the separate unions when time for action came.² One of the most imposing of the international organizations is the International Federation of Ship, Dock and River Workers. Attempts are now being made to extend its organization to this country. Its methods as declared in advance by one of the agitators now perfecting the organization are far from peaceful. It aims "to unite the longshoremen of America and utilize the organized strength of all for the welfare of each," and "to enforce

¹ *First Annual Report of the Dock, Wharf, Riverside and General Laborers' Union of Great Britain and Ireland, 1890*, p. 149.

² See *supra*, p. 69.

claims for wages.”¹ The sympathetic strike is easily discernible here between the lines. In fact such strikes have been threatened more than once. Dispatches to the Associated Press at the close of 1896 reported that “plans for a strike of the dock laborers of the world had been completed in all but the minutest details.”² Again during the strike at the Hamburg Docks, attempts were made to inaugurate sympathetic uprisings in other parts of the world, but with no results.

But one word more remains to be said in regard to the probability of gigantic sympathetic strikes as it is indicated by the unions themselves. It refers directly only to general strikes—where all have a grievance—but it indirectly throws light upon the sympathetic problem. From the earliest days of strikes to the present the question of area has been a source of great disagreement. Assuming that a large number of men in several establishments, or several localities even, have common grievances, should the strike include them all or should but a portion of the whole number be allowed to leave work while the remainder contribute to their support? The strike history of England shows that both plans have been tried, although a decided preference seems to have been given to the latter. It was this “plan of campaign” which gave rise to the sympathetic lockout movement in 1851. Strike rules often limit the extent of a strike to 10 per cent. or even to 2 per cent. of the membership of the union.³

The movement inaugurated by the American Federation

¹ New York *Evening Post*, May 28, 1897, 6.

² *Ibid.*, Sept., 5, 1896.

³ *National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, Report on Trades Societies and Strikes*, 1860, pages 29 and 117. Also *The Economic Journal*, vol. iii, p. 417.

of Labor in 1888 for an eight-hour day indicates this same general tendency. President Gompers in his address to the convention of the Federation held that year, advised

"that some day be set apart not later than 1890 when the working people of the entire country shall be called upon to simultaneously demand the enforcement of eight hours as a day's work."¹

According to this suggestion, May 1, 1890, was fixed as the date for inaugurating the new system.² During the intervening year and a half the subject was kept constantly before the public. In 1889, 98 mass meetings were held, while 60,000 pamphlets and 250,000 circulars were distributed over the whole country. As the time for carrying out the plan approached, public opinion began to show signs of alarm. The prospect of strikes on a tremendous scale was not a pleasant one. It was, therefore, with a very general feeling of relief that the decision of the convention held in December, 1889, was heard. President Gompers' suggestion again shaped the organization's policy. In his address he advised,

"that one or two trades whose organizations are affiliated be selected . . . upon which to concentrate the whole efforts of Organized Labor to secure the eight-hour work day May, 1890; that all organizations contribute a specified sum per member to aid in winning the first victory. Upon the successful termination of the first contest, the Executive Council shall select another trade and shall proceed as in the case of the first, and so continue."³

In accordance with this policy, the carpenters were chosen to lead the way. In a large number of cases, affecting some 50,000 to 60,000 men, no strike was required to enforce the demand. Of the 5000 who struck a very great majority achieved success⁴. It is unnecessary to follow the history further. The change from the "general strike" policy to

¹ *Report*, 1888, p. 11.

² *Ibid.*, p. 29.

³ *Ibid.*, 1889, p. 15.

⁴ *Bradstreet's*, v. 18, p. 343.

the "successive strike" policy is evident, as is also the economic reason which caused the change.

The "general strike" question has several times become international. In 1891 at the international Labor Congress held in Brussels, an attempt was made to get the opinion of the delegates upon the advisability of declaring a universal strike in case war broke out among the nations. The proposal was supported unanimously by the Dutch delegates, the French delegates were divided, but the representatives of all other nationalities stood unanimously against the proposition.¹

It is among the coal miners, however, that these attempts have been most conspicuous and most instructive. At the Second International Congress of Coal Miners held at Jolimont, Switzerland, in 1889, a resolution was introduced, inviting all miners represented "to coöperate in a strike movement which should commence on the first of May, 1891," in order to gain the eight-hour day. The opposition to this resolution proved so great that it was withdrawn in favor of another which took a less positive stand. It declared that the Congress was "favorable in principle to an international strike of miners in order to bring about an eight-hour day," and made it the duty of all delegates to inform their constituencies upon the question. Even this was too radical policy for the Congress. The resolution which was finally carried by a vote of 94 to 4 declared merely that "it is right that the Unions and Federations of Miners in all the countries represented should examine the principle of an international strike," and advised the calling of an extra congress in April, 1891, to decide the question.² In accordance with this resolution representatives of over 700,000 miners as-

¹ *Strikes and Lockouts in 1890*, pages 37 and 38. (Parl. Papers, 1890-91, v. lxxviii.)

² *Ibid.*, p. 30.

sembled in Paris during the following April.¹ When the proposal for a "universal strike" was introduced, the discussion became animated and exciting. The amount of feeling displayed by outsiders became so great that the public was ultimately excluded from the hall where the Congress had assembled. The resolution declared "that the Congress regarded a general international strike necessary to obtain an eight-hour day." Efforts were to be made to induce governments to adopt some joint agreement as to legislative action in regard to the eight-hour day. If such efforts should fail, "the congress instructs the international committee to take such measures as may be necessary to bring about an international strike." In the amended form in which the resolution was finally adopted, the Congress merely declared that an international strike "may become necessary" for obtaining the eight-hour day. No mention whatever was made of the steps to be taken in case the efforts at governmental agreement should fail. At the Congress held a year later another resolution of similar import was passed. The congress considered that the question of an international strike "should be discussed on all sides," and that there was "good cause for its realization" if all other means failed.² The question has received no serious discussion since that date. From all this it is evident that miners at least do not believe that the efficacy of a strike increases directly with its size. Colossal strikes are advocated by trades unions in proportion as they are socialistic.³ As long as the so-called laboring classes comprise two-

¹ *Strikes and Lockouts in 1890*, p. 31.

² *Ibid.*, 1891, pages 88 and 89. (Parl. Papers, 1893-94, v. lxxxiii, Part i.)

³ *Ibid.*, 1890, p. 33. (Parl. Papers, 1890-91, v. lxxviii.) The programme of the English socialistic league includes "universal strikes." See R. A. Woods, *English Social Movements*, p. 47.

thirds of the "public" to be injured by such a strike, just so long will the existing opposition remain.¹

The bearing of this conclusion upon the question of large *sympathetic* strikes is plain. If, in the broadening of its area, a "grievance strike" quickly reaches its "point of diminishing returns," how much more must this be true of sympathetic strikes? The general extension may be dreaded, but the sympathetic extension is dreaded and *denounced*. Its power is thus affected by a cause which does not operate in the former case. Its "point of diminishing returns" is even more quickly reached. The colossal sympathetic strike is, therefore, a possibility, although little more than that.

The reasons which have led to this conclusion may be summarized here. Sympathetic strikes upon an extensive scale have occurred in the past, but usually under the management of an "unbroken" union. Thoroughly established unions have expressed sympathy with fellow strikers—have shown their sympathy by financial assistance oftentimes,—but have almost without exception refused to endorse the policy of sympathetic striking. Even the unions which seem to believe most heartily in the plan, realize its necessary limitations,—realize, in fact, that, beyond a certain point, sympathetic assistance in the form of strikes ceases to assist. Finally, it appears that the power of strikes in general is rarely in proportion to their size, and that unions realize this fact. "Extension" *per se* proves itself an extension of injuries rather than of good.

¹See Mallock, *Labor and the Popular Welfare*, pages 309-314. Also an article by Professor Nicholson in the *Economic Journal*, vol. ii, p. 489.

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VITA.

THE author of this dissertation, Fred. Smith Hall, was born June 2, 1870, at Washington, D. C. He was prepared for college at Mount Hermon School, Mount Hermon, Mass., and at the Montclair High School, Montclair, N. J. Entering Wesleyan University in 1889, he gave special attention to Latin, Greek and economics, and was graduated with the degree of A. B. in 1893. In 1890 he received the Hibbard prize in elocution.

During the year 1893-1894, the author was engaged as instructor in Latin and Greek at the Montclair Military Academy, Montclair, N. J. At the same time he attended a course of lectures upon European history at Columbia University; also a seminar upon bimetallism conducted by Professor Seligman. The year 1894-1895 was spent in the advertising business in New York City.

In October, 1895, the author entered Columbia University as candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, taking a three years' course. During the first two of these years, he held successively a scholarship in economics and a fellowship in finance. During the last year he was engaged as instructor in economic history and economics in the Misses Bodman's School for Girls in Brooklyn, N. Y.

As a graduate student at Columbia University, the author had economics as a major subject with American history and sociology as minors. He attended lectures by Professors Mayo-Smith, Seligman, Clark, Giddings, Burgess, Dunning, Osgood and Dr. Bancroft. He also attended Professor

Mayo-Smith's seminars in political economy and in statistics, Professor Seligman's seminar in political economy and finance, and Professor Clark's seminar in economic theory. During the years 1895-1896 and 1896-1897 he assisted in the preparation of two reports of the committee on statistics of the Charity Organization Society upon homeless men and destitute families.

